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Editors' Note 
We are pleased to present Pandora's Box for 2006. 
The theme of this year's edition of Pandora's Box ,"Women and Peace", was derived 
from the focus of this year's International Women's Day celebrations, "Women Striving 
for a Peaceful Society" . 
In this year's edition of Pandora's Box we aimed to recognize that, although peace is still 
not a reality for many women throughout the world, there are many dedicated 
individuals striving for a peaceful society both in Australia and internationally. 
There are a number of people to whom we would like to pass on our thanks. Firstly, the 
contributors for giving their time and expertise in order to pass on their insights for the 
issue, "Women and Peace" . Secondly, Ms. Clare Cappa, from the University of 
Queensland Law School, for adjudicating the Magistrates Work Experience Program 
Essay Competition. Thirdly, all W ATL members, especially Kathryn Purcell (President) 
and Shona Duniam (Vice-President) for their support throughout the year. Finally, we 
would like to pass on our deepest appreciation to Chris Henderson. Chris assisted us 
greatly through the year, not only volunteering to write our foreword but also by 
passing the word around about Pandora's Box and connecting us with two of our 
contributors for 2006. 
We hope that reading the 2006 edition of Pandora's Box not only provokes consideration 
of the daily struggles of many women towards peace, but also inspires action as 
exemplified by the women identified in the following pages. 
"To many people war is seen as something masculine and peace as feminine. In fact both men and 
women need to work together to build genuine peace . . .  I wish your efforts every success. " 
- The Dalai Lama. 
Gail Blaber and Bridget Daly 
Editors of Pandora's Box for 2006. 
Whilst the editors have checked the references for authenticity, any mistakes belong to the authors 
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Foreword 
Chris Hendersont 
I am writing on 21st September - a date established by the United Nations in 2001 as
International Day of Peace. Until last year I saw this day as a symbolic if innocuous 
public affirmation of hope. As an activist I have left such events to others while I 
concentrate on projects that I have considered to have more chance of making a 
difference. The potential of this day was brought home to me by frontline aid workers. 
For them, peace for one day means a global ceasefire and a day of peace and non­
violence. This becomes a day when food and medical supplies can be distributed; when 
people can be transported to safety; when dialogue can be initiated. 
Naming a day is a powerful sign of 'ordinary' people power and it is gaining purchase 
as a real possibility, even though it may not reach or affect the outcome for a woman 
raped in a remote village at gunpoint today or on the day you read this. One hundred 
and ninety two member nations of the United Nations (UN) created peace activities 
today. In my city, Brisbane, it has become a week-long series of events, with the 
conservative tabloid providing an astounding double page spread, and a youth peace 
parliament taking over Parliament House for a day with the support and involvement of 
MPs. From little things, big things grow and from the aid workers and this year's 
International Day of Peace I have learned a sobering lesson. 
What counts as 'peace' though? The UN focuses not on defining peace, but on what 
defines and creates a culture of peace: 'a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of 
life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through 
dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations' .2 
This issue of Pandora's Box offers a challenging and insightful intersection of articles 
that allows us to study and make known those underlying causes of violence and 
injustice and to celebrate and learn from the work of activists such as Aung San Suu Kyi 
and Jane Dai. 
How we respond is, for me, the key question. Do we read and move on, concerned 
bystanders leaving practice to others? Does cynicism, procrastination or resignation 
discount the potential of action before it has begun? In part, our response will depend 
on becoming present to the peace we want in our own lives as a powerful base from 
which to act. 
Set free by this issue of Pandora's Box, thank goodness, is hape, consciously aware and 
grounded in wisdom. Left to its own devices, hope will wither. Combined with 
informed, strategic action in our own lives and in our communities, it can support us in 
the long haul essential for creating a sustainable culture of peace. 
1 With special thanks to Spiderlily Redgold who assisted with the final polish. 
2 (UN Resolutions A/RES/52/13: Culture of Peace and A/RES/53/2.43, Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace). 
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So what else does Pandora offer this year? Ah yes - an analysis of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325: Women, Peace and Security - a tool for creating peace and justice, for 
addressing women's security and, crucially, for ensuring that women's voices and 
gender mainstreaming inform and are included in all aspects of the peace process. 
UN resolutions, the minute they are passed by the UN, become part of the body of 
international law. In Australia, UN resolutions are not automatically reinforced or 
supported by domestic law. It is up to us as citizens to make the government create law 
in the spirit of each and every resolution passed by the UN. We have a government 
deeply committed to war but apparently not to peace or to women's involvement in the 
peace process, given that our government has declared war since this resolution was 
passed in 2000, and has not acted to transform this international obligation into 
domestic policy. 
This academic journal for women in law will be read by a wider audience. It is likely to 
be read by those with privilege and position, by those with education. My question: who 
will take up and champion this issue if not us - you and me? 
If you walk in the world knowing that peace is truly possible and can be created by your 
actions, what are you prepared to do? Where would you start? 
Consider that we - every one of us who picks up this journal and begins reading - can 
create world peace through our actions. I invite you to join an organisation that works to 
create a culture of peace. I belong to the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom which is an international champion of resolution 1325. Maybe there are other 
organisations that suit you better. Belonging to an organisation means that you stand up 
to be counted, even if you do not have the time to attend meetings. Your endorsement 
through joining a peace organisation will support others and therefore create and 
sustain action and possibility. 
I thank and commend the editors and authors of this year's Pandora's Box for lifting the 
lid on creating a culture of peace. International Day of Peace has blossomed and borne 
fruit. I look forward to marvelling at the actions we will take as a result of delving into 
this edition and for the transformations we will cause together. 
lV 
Speech Delivered at the Queensland Government's Office of Women 
celebrations for International Women's Day 2006. 
Maree Klemm 
Maree Klemm was recognised as a "Woman of Peace" by the Queensland Government's Office of 
Women for the celebrations of International Women's Day, 2006. Maree's main areas of 
community interest have fallen into four broad categories: social justice and human rights, 
internationalism and multiculturalism, sustainable development and women's equity. As such, 
she has volunteered for many organisations including Amnesty International Australia, Rotary 
International and the Ethnic Community Council of Queensland. 
Maree Klemm has enjoyed a long and fruitful career in the financial services and resource sector. 
While still heavily involved in her career, events unfolding in Australian society relating to 
asylum seekers motivated Maree to move from being purely a 'funder' of good causes, to someone 
who gets out there and takes a stand. In Maree's own words: she now walks the talk. 
Maree encourages people to connect with others of a like mind and openly communicate our hopes 
for peace. In her words, "In your own personal way, voice your thoughts and feelings about your 
visions of peace in your communities and you will attract like-minded people. Then your 
collective voice becomes louder and more influential, you become stronger in your convictions 
and the proliferation of peace spreads from your local communities to the wider world." 
The following is the speech Maree presented at the International Women's Day celebrations 2006. 
It gave me a great thrill of affirmation to be invited to represent the countless 
women striving for a peaceful society and to participate in the Queensland 
Government's Office of Women celebrations for International Women's Day. 
As I read through the profiles of the women speaking here today. I found many 
sources of inspiration. One that sticks in my mind is Reverend Alex's description 
of "being just a nobody that knew she had a gift and a destiny" . It captures the 
individuality of all "nobody" women of peace:- the gift of that inner peace and 
conviction that anchors us and keeps us clear sighted in our advocacy and 
destiny for a universal culture of peace. 
At a personal and community level, we come together to celebrate the themes of 
International Women's Day, and to nurture each other in our solidarity for peace. 
That solidarity is a priceless gift. We are strengthened, knowing that there are 
others who share our hope & vision for peace, and who will help us to reach that 
most necessary, desirable and achievable destiny, diverse and peaceful societies 
around the world. 
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Studies in "Peace and Conflict Resolution" draw a strong correlation between 
violence on a personal and local community level, with violence on a national 
and international scale. Throughout history those societies displaying absolute 
power & violent, warlike aggression were those in which the structure of society 
was designed to maintain dominance of men over women and adults over 
children, through violence or the threat of violence. In contrast, in societies where 
the rights of women and children are protected, the national character is far less 
aggressive and violent, and developmental progress thrives in a pre-dominantly 
peaceful environment. Riane Eisler' s studies of 89 countries show that the status 
of women is a more accurate indicator of the nation's general quality of life, than 
any financial or economic indicator. 
As we meditate on our theme for International Women's Day, "Women Striving 
for a Peaceful Society" let's be mindful that intimate violence in our homes and 
schools is as monstrous as armed warfare fueled by economic, social and political 
injustices. How many social customs and public policies accept, condone, even 
promote intimate violence? Who raises their voices against this violence in the 
home, school and local community? Simple logic tells us that early conditioning 
to accept violence as a means of imposing one's will on another, is universal 
training for violent and repressive regimes. Violence (meaning the lack of peace) 
on the domestic scale sadly does scale up to warfare and conflict on an 
international scale. The vicious cycle of the abused child becoming the abuser, is 
well understood. Let's strive to intervene for the better, in the cycle of violence, 
and create instead the circle of peace. 
Human relations and our value of human rights are learned in the family, 
observing the relationship between our parents and their relationships with their 
children. In past times (for some), and in more authoritarian and patriarchal 
societies, the control of these relationships, with force and violence, by the male 
was condoned by law, religion and custom. Our inability to sustain peace, is the 
grim legacy of this structure, which entrenches subservience and repression. 
Eleanor Roosevelt, advocating for the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, said that our rights are a very difficult concept to define across 
cultures and around the world. However, she said with great wisdom, we will 
universally recognize basic human rights in "small matters that are close to 
home" . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is truly a declaration and 
charter for peace on all levels, from the personal to the global. 
The sad statistics reveal that violence against women and children are the most 
widely violated human rights across all societies. This correlation of intimate 
violence and war is so often overlooked or suppressed on the global political 
stage and dismissed as insignificant "small matters close to home", a mere 
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domestic issue, nothing relevant to the world's power- brokers and peace­
brokers. 
How wrong that view is and how detrimental to peace. 
We might reflect on how our personal contribution to world peace begins with 
small matters close to home. With this conviction, we can be empowered to make 
our world more peaceful and to know that our individual contribution to peace 
is significant, validating and reinforcing for us all . Individual protection, respect, 
indeed reverence of women and children and of all humans, is the basis of 
attaining and sustaining peace. We "nobody women of peace", share the gift of 
our vision for peace and ask you to join us in reaching and holding that destiny -
peaceful societies. 
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Women and security: 'You cannot dance if you cannot stand' 
Elisabeth Porter 
www.opendemocracy.net 
Elisabeth Porter has taught Politics, Peace and War and Sociology at Flinders University of SA, 
University of Ulster and Southern Cross University. She has published widely on women and 
politics, dialogue across difference and feminist ethics. Her Peacebuilding: Women in 
International Perspective (Routledge) will be available 2007. Lis is Professor and Head of School 
of International Studies at University of South Australia. Three adult children, a granddaughter 
and fabulous partner provide joy. She believes that justice, equality, rights and compassion are 
central to peacebuilding. (Elisabeth.Porter@unisa.edu.au) 
To translate Resolu tion 1325 into reality, we must understand that there are gendered 
and cultural views on security, and include women in formal political processes, says 
Elisabeth Porter. 
Can women make a difference to peace and security? 
Yes, if the rhetoric about including women is translated into reality. Before 
suggesting how, I must make three qualifications. First, I am Australian and have 
worked in Northern Ireland during 1990, from 1994-1999 and since 2004. 
Personally, it is not possible to live in a divided society that is inherently violent 
and where patriarchal attitudes and values pervade everyday living (despite 
progressive equality legislation) without feeling committed to working toward 
change. Yet in a place where identity markers define both exclusion and 
inclusion, it is not easy to work as an 'inside-outsider', living in the culture, 
aware of its limitations and possibilities, yet always being conscious of being 
different in a culture where diversity is not yet celebrated. 
The second qualifier regards the involvement of women in Northern Ireland in 
peace processes. Northern Ireland has a history of strong women making a 
difference. However, I write this in mid-September 2005, after the worst riots in 
Belfast for a decade. Last Saturday, the road I live in was blocked by loyalists 
(many other roads were also blocked) in support of the Orangemen' s protests 
about having their march redirected 100 metres (in order to lessen offence to a 
nationalist community) . I gained permission from the police to walk my dog 
through the line of protesters and was appalled to find the bulk were young 
women and children and kept thinking, why did I find this so appalling? We 
have seen more than a week of violence, disruptions to normal activities, 
hijacking of cars and buses, burning of vehicles and shops, shootings and 
violence aimed at the police, accusations of police brutality and the invoking of 
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much tension and fear. Many loyalist women and children visibly support this 
violence. There are few women elected political representatives and few women 
publicly voicing alternatives. The message is clear, women potentially can make 
a difference but we must never assume they always will. 
In many places, women socialise children into a cultural identity that includes 
the learning of ethnic hatred. Some Catholic and Protestant women in Northern 
Ireland perpetuate sectarianism that promotes violence. In Rwanda, many 
women encouraged revenge for the dead. Women have been liberation fighters 
in Eritrea, Nicaragua and Indonesia. In Eritrea, Sri Lanka, South Africa and 
across Latin America, women are one-third of the guerrilla armies. 
My third qualification refers to the significance of Resolution 1325 and practices 
within the United Nations. In April 2005, I attended the United Nations 
University Directors meeting in Bonn, Germany. United Nations University acts 
as a UN think-tank and has both 'Peace and Governance' and 'Environment and 
Sustainable Development' strands. I was astonished to find that at this meeting, 
there were 23 men and two women. Aren't universities supposed to be 
enlightened institutions where matters of equality and inclusion of difference are 
taken seriously? Several directors agreed with me that there should be more 
women present. Why? For reasons of gender equity, plural inclusivity and 
because of women's potential unique contribution. 
Thus, I tum to the main points of this article and affirm that women can make a 
difference, that 1325 is unprecedented in calling on persons to take action in: 
increasing women's participation in decision-making and peace processes; 
including gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; encouraging the 
protection of women; and integrating gender mainstreaming in UN programs by 
assessing the in/ equality implications for women and men of all policies and 
programs. 
Yet in each of these four key areas, there are stark failures in translating the 
rhetoric into reality . Three changes are necessary: expand the concept of peace­
building in order to transfer skills acquired in informal work to participation in 
decision-making; understand that security means different things to different 
groups and; keep insisting on the need for quotas and benchmarks. 
Women as victims of armed conflict and as peace-builders 
While I have already mentioned that women are actors in armed conflict, more 
women are victims of conflict. Women are vulnerable, because whether it is 
Burundi, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Algeria or Jerusalem, internal conflicts are not 
fought primarily in battlefields but in villages and towns where women and 
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children remain. Further, violence often flows back home. In Northern Ireland, 
men in security forces have approved arms because of being potential targets, 
while paramilitary groups retain illicit arms. 
In war zones and in conflict societies, women are not just victims, many are 
active peace-builders. The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing, 
was instrumental in defining those areas of concern considered to represent the 
major obstacles to women's advancement and making recommendations for 
change. Since then, the global network of NGOs working on women's rights has 
expanded. This includes lobbying the UN in the lead up to the 24 October 2000 
Security Council session on Women, Peace and Security. The resultant resolution 
is a global advocacy tool. 
It is a necessary resolution because women are active in informal peace protests, 
community dialogue, promoting intercultural tolerance and in practical peace 
initiatives. However, they are overwhelmingly absent in formal peace processes. 
They must be included in formal processes in order to establish meaningful 
gender equality . 
Why should women be present at negotiating tables? 
Does it really matter if women are present at negotiating tables or in formal 
peace processes? Yes it does . 
• First, women and men are affected by conflict and therefore also are
affected by the consequences of peace agreements. These agreements are
not merely about ending war, they are also about establishing the
conditions for new just societies where plural perspectives are taken into
account.
• Second, women's inclusion in all stages of peace processes is essential for
inclusive social justice.
• Third, the presence of women in political, policy and legal decision­
making contexts often makes a difference to the sorts of issues addressed
like education, health, nutrition, childcare and human security needs in
places as varied as South Africa, Israel, Palestine, Liberia or Guatemala.
Women universally are prime carers in families and communities and they have 
a huge interest in community stability, so they play important roles in peace­
building in unofficial ways. Some women are peace activists advocating for non­
violence, others are mediators, trauma healing councillors, practitioners 
addressing the root causes of violence, educators or facilitators of capacity­
building. Many women assist dialogue between husbands or brothers in warring 
factions, tribes, clans or ethnic groups. Women often bridge divides across 
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traditional ethnic, religious and cultural divisions, coming together on the shared 
concerns about practicalities of life. In Azerbaijan, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Great Lakes Region, the Middle East, Northern Ireland 
and Somalia, women work collaboratively across ethnic and religious lines to 
make valuable contributions to peace processes despite little awareness of 1325. 
Stella Tamang of one of Nepal's largest indigenous groups argues that women at 
the negotiating table "will introduce practical workable solutions to the conflict" . 
The Mano River Women's Peace Network of women from Liberia, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone opened pathways of communication between warring factions that 
led to reopening of borders and restoring of diplomatic relations. 
Why should the understanding of peace-building be expanded? 
Narrow definitions of peace-building sit within the post-conflict reconstruction 
stage, after peace settlements. This definition has two significant consequences 
for women. 
• First, it overlooks all the hands-on, unofficial work women do to build
peace in grassroots groups, communities and families.
• Second, it provides inadequate validation for including women at
negotiating tables. Failure to accord acknowledgment for women's active
conciliation in all stages of peace processes, consistently results in their
exclusion from political decision-making.
I am suggesting that peace-building is a process that needs to flow through the 
pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages and elaborate this in my 
forthcoming book, Peace-building: Women in International Perspectives. 1  Peace 
processes consist of both formal and informal activities. Women are prominent in 
informal peace work. However, despite 1325, they are rare in formal peace 
processes as defined by the UN to include "early warning, preventive diplomacy, 
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and global disarmament" . 
The UN distinguishes between different aspects of these processes. Peacemaking 
includes mediation, conciliation, arbitration and negotiation to bring hostile 
parties to agreement. Peacekeeping involves keeping parties from fighting or 
harming each other through multinational forces of armed soldiers and police. 
Peace-building includes constructing the conditions of society to foster peace 
through development, aid, human rights education, reconciliation and the 
restoration of community life. In the UN, peace-building typically refers to 
formal approaches used in post-conflict reconstruction. 
1 Elisabeth Porter, Peace-building: Women in International Perspectives (2006).
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As Christine Chink.in argues, for many women this concept of 'post-conflict' is a 
problem.2 When active conflict or violence ceases, women still have to deal with 
traumatised children, family members who were combatants and the inevitable 
difficulties of meeting everyday needs while dealing with intense traumas. The 
notion of 'reconstruction' may also seem meaningless for women who never 
have known full citizenship, social justice or a respect for human dignity and 
rights. 
So it is a positive thing that the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan is expanding 
his view and says, ' the participation of women and girls and inclusion of gender 
perspectives in both formal and informal peace processes are crucial in the 
establishment of sustainable peace' . Certainly, UNIFEM's emphasis on peaceful, 
just relationships of equality contrasts with orthodox emphases on structural 
reconstruction. 
Most women's understandings of peace-building are far broader and more 
holistic than UN or conventional usages of the term. As Sanam Anderlini writes 
in Women, Violent Conflict and Peace-building: Global Perspectives , "the intricate 
tapestry of what constitutes real peace and security . . .  [includes] social justice, 
domestic reform, women's rights, co-existence, tolerance, participatory 
democracy, transparency and non-violent dialogue as necessary ingredients for 
addressing social differences and building sustainable peace" .3 
Human security and well-being 
Part of translating 1325' s rhetoric into reality is understanding that there are 
gendered and cultural views on security. Whilst foreign policy assumes that a 
military presence tightens security, such militarism threatens security for women 
who are victims of war-rape or are used sexually by peacekeepers. 
In their book, Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana provide examples of how 
women understand peace-building and security.4 In South Sudan, for Nuer 
women, "making peace means figuring out how to meet the material, social and 
spiritual requirements of life" . Similiarly, with women in Somalia, "peace is not 
seen as a matter of discussion, but as a way of living, of security and food for 
2 Christine Chinkin, 'Peace Agreements as a Means or Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring
Participation of Women' (Background Paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting of the United Nations 
Division for the Advancement of Women, Ottawa, 10-13 November 2003). 
3 Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Rita Manchanda, and Shereen Karmali, 'Women, Violent Conflict and Peace­
Building: Global Perspectives'. International Conference, London, May 1999 (London: International A lert, 
2000). 
4 Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, Where are the girls? Girls Fighting Forces Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone
and Mozambique, Their Lives After The War (2004).
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your family, of the future for your children" . In Sierra Leone, building peace 
means /1 taking in the children of neighbours, friends or family members who 
were killed in the war" . In Kosovo, /1 peace work means rebuilding damaged 
houses as well as friendships with former neighbours who had turned against 
them during conflict" . Lebanese women discover peace-building is building 
bridges between factions involved in the civil war. All these activities revolve 
around connections, healing, spiritual wounds, rebuilding relationships and 
meeting everyday family needs. 
Accordingly, when women are present around negotiating tables (Guatemala, 
South Africa, Northern Ireland, East Timor), they initiate different issues -
questions related to human security and well-being - like feeling safe and being 
inclusive, as well as focusing on the practical needs of food, water, health, 
education, land rights and economic livelihood. As Johan Galtung puts it, 
'human security' initiates a new paradigm where people's needs are central to 
international security and root causes of insecurity are tackled. 5 
What is the difference that makes the difference? 
In Guatemala, women's participation in formal negotiations resulted in specific 
commitments to women on housing, credit and land, attempts to locate children 
and orphans, penalising sexual harassment and creating the National Women's 
Forum. In South Africa, women across all parties agreed that each party should 
have one-third female representation in each negotiating team for the 
Constitution process. The South African Constitution includes a comprehensive 
Bill of Rights with gains for women on reproduction, property rights, healthcare, 
education and culture. In Northern Ireland, the two representatives of the 
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition lobbied for mixed housing and the early 
release and reintegration of political prisoners. 
There are many positive instances of 1325 helping women to make a difference.6 
In Sri Lanka, in 2002, the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
supported by Norway, established a subcommittee on gender issues to elaborate 
gender-sensitive guidelines for the peace process. In Somalia, in 2002, fifty 
women undertook training in negotiation skills and the provisions of 1325 in 
order to take part in the peace process. 
s Johan Galtung, 'The Security Approach and the Peace Approach: Factors Conditioning the Choice'
(Presented at the United Nations World Culture Open - Building Peace Through Harmonious Diversity, 
New York, 9 October 2004). 
6 United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security . Inventory of United Nations
Resources on Women, Peace and Security (2004) 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/resources/wps/lnventory-110ct2004.pdf> 
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It is overwhelmingly the case that it is women in NGOs and feminist academics 
who are really utilising the resolution - more than politicians and policy-makers. 
In Rwanda, even in a context where almost every woman survivor of the 
genocide has a dramatic story of rape, hunger, fear, flight and loss - women 
began forming groups to confront common problems. By 1999, Rwandan 
women's organisations exceeded 15,000. After 1994, the UNHCR began the 
Rwanda Women's Initiative, taking a practical approach to assisting income, 
agriculture, land title, childcare and gender-related violence. When Erin Baines, 
researcher, asked a Rwandan woman if the Initiative had made a difference in 
her life, she replied, /1 you cannot dance if you cannot stand" . 
Many women's organisations involve both Hutu and Tutsi groups. These groups 
concentrate on what unites rather than divides, that is, the commonalities women 
face everywhere such as poverty, violence against women, feeding their children 
and shelter. Pro-Femmes? the umbrella organisation of women's groups mobilises 
women /1 to spearhead the promotion of a culture of peace, tolerance and non­
violence in grassroots activities" . There is the view among survivors that women 
are better than men at forgiving, reconciling and building peace. 
Ironically, Rwanda has now surpassed Sweden as the country with the highest 
proportion of women legislators. From the 2003 elections, women hold 48.8 % of 
the seats in the National Assembly and nine out of 28 ministerial posts. Funding 
from the Netherlands trained women in decision-making and political 
awareness. Such a commitment helps translate rhetoric into reality. 
But let us return to Northern Ireland, where there are many dedicated women 
peace activists and hundreds of small women's groups, for a final example. Betty 
Williams and Mairead Corrigan led large demonstrations of Catholics and 
Protestants to protest against terrorist violence in 1976 and were awarded the 
Nobel Prize. Despite being deeply divided politically, activists in Northern 
Ireland come together over basic issues of childcare, housing, education and job 
skills, avoiding political differences. Two historic examples of women making a 
difference include the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and their place at the 
negotiating table, and the McCartney sisters' stance against the IRA and the 
demand that there can be no peace without justice. 
'The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition was initiated by women with long 
histories of engagement in civil, human and workers' rights. The Women's 
Coalition adopted equality, human rights and inclusion as their principles. They 
also agreed that participants should acknowledge their political identity 
differences rather than do what is more typical in Northern Ireland, keep silent 
or fight about controversial differences. An explicit discussion of differences, 
divisions, discord and political dissonance is necessary to move beyond 
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intolerance of others' views and sectarian attitudes and practices.7 In 'transversal 
politics', you keep your identity intact while openly trying to understand others' 
identities. In 1996, the Coalition gained enough votes to secure two seats in the 
multi-party peace negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland that led to the 
Belfast Agreement in April 1998. They put on the agenda issues like victims' rights, 
reconciliation and the need for a Civic Forum. 
Monica McWilliams, the Coalition's leader talks of "women's central role in 
conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building"; of the dangers of 
sectarianism, which see " the world exclusively in terms of the interest of your 
"own" side as against the other side"; and of the importance of "working with, 
not burying, our differences" . The Coalition made a noteworthy difference to 
electoral politics in Northern Ireland, with forthright and positive women 
presenting a vision of how politics should be different. Whenever the parties 
were bogged down, the women brought the debates back to personal issues of 
bereavement, loss and hopes for children's future. 
In a bar fight on 30 January 2005, Robert McCartney was murdered by a known 
leader of the IRA and several of his associates. McCartney' s five sisters - Paula, 
Catherine, Gemma, Claire and Donna - and his fiance Bridgeen Hagans are 
demanding justice. These women "are being seen as a metaphor for where the 
nation finds itself - still struggling for unity, tom by savage grief yet looking for 
justice, peace and reconciliation" .8 Five days after the murder, the women held a 
candlelight vigil attended by 600 people to protest at the IRA cover-up. 
Sometimes, women prompt the conscience of the nation. Since 1982, Sicilian 
women have challenged the iron grip of the mafia; since 1996 the committee of 
soldiers' mothers in Russia have campaigned against conscription in the war in 
Chechnya; and more recently in Northern Ireland, the McCartney sisters have 
taken an important stance. Paula McCartney says, "Yes, absolutely, this is about 
women standing up. The men tend to huff and puff and egos come in to play, 
and it goes round and round, and it always ends in more violence . . .  But we want 
real justice, not more violence" . Peace and violence cannot coexist. Anger is 'a 
crippling emotion' when tied with revenge. 
These women say, "we have no fear of the IRA . . .  and we will not be bullied by 
them" . This is worth mentioning because Northern Ireland sectarian conflict has 
claimed more than 200 lives since the paramilitary organisations called their 1994 
ceasefires and only thirty people have been prosecuted for murder. Such women 
motivate other families who have lost family through paramilitary murders. 
7 Elisabeth Porter (2003)
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/ articles/ www .peacestudiesjournal.org. uk/ docs/Security. pdf> 
s Jo-Ann Moriarty, The Republican, 14 March 2005.
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So - is the rhetoric of Resolution 1325 being translated into reality? 
Yes and no. Women's global participation in peace and security concerns 
continues in mediation, conciliation, trauma counsel, healing and memory work, 
providing health care for survivors of rape and HIV/ AIDs sufferers. Women and 
men continue to build bridges across ethnic, religious and cultural divisions, 
opposing war and militarism in innovative and creative ways. 
Despite the significance of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 
women remain absent or are marginalised from negotiating tables, political 
decision-making opportunities and senior advisory positions. Inclusion matters. 
Without plural inclusivity, there is no peace with justice and equality and 1325' s 
call to "all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace 
agreements, to adopt a gender perspective" goes unheeded. The substantive 
content and implementation of peace agreements require balance between 
women-specific provisions and gender mainstreaming. 
What exactly do I mean by the latter? "Mainstreaming gender equality" means 
transforming the "mainstream" and focusing on the systems and structures that 
create disadvantages for women and men. Mainstreaming gender is all about 
working within institutions to integrate equality concerns into all policies, 
programs and projects so that issues of gender equality become part of 
organisations' actions, beliefs, values, priorities, needs and actual decisions. 
Sometimes, this can result in a token gesture, so an organisation makes sure there 
is a woman on a committee but some men still make sexist jokes or ridicule the 
woman's contribution. Thus, often it is important to have women-only events to 
enable women's voices to come through clearly, particularly if there are sensitive 
issues to discuss like women's discrimination, rape or dowry price. For example, 
Astrid Heiberg was a Norwegian representative to a Gender Sub-Committee to 
the Sri Lankan peace talks of 2003. She tells how women's interaction in 
negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the women in the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam became more open when the Government men 
left, and she created a "women-only space" . 
In 2000, Sanam Anderlini gave four warnings in a preliminary audit on the 
international community's response to women, peace and security.9 First, while 
the explicit endorsement of women's groups and civil society participation in 
peace processes is unprecedented, the absence of actual quotas, benchmarks and 
timelines is of concern. Second, while the endorsement of the need for 
peacekeepers and civilian personnel in peace processes is clear, "without the core 
commitment of governments to provide additional funds, these measures can be 
9 Sanarn Anderlini, Women, Peace and Security: A Policy Audit. From the Beijing Platfonn for Action to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 and Beyond (2000). 
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ignored or not implemented adequately" . Third, with regard to protection of 
women, "without an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism and 
incentives for compliance . .  . it is likely that the necessary changes are not made" . 
Fourth, much more gender mainstreaming needs to be done to translate rhetoric 
into concrete progress. Ways to reduce gender disparity need to be built into 
organisations' policies, programs and projects. The UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) define gender mainstreaming as "a strategy for making the 
concerns and experiences of women as well as men an integral part of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all 
political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, 
and inequality is not perpetuated" . Five years on, these concerns remain. 
During 2001 and 2002, Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen J ohnson-Sirleaf1 travelled to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, East Timor, the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Guinea, Israel, Liberia, the occupied Palestinian 
territories, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia to present an independent 
assessment in their Women, War and Peace. They found terrible stories, but also 
women who were surviving trauma and rebuilding communities .2  Yet, " time 
and again women described the wonderful documents that had been created and 
signed - and the failure to implement most of what has been promised" .  
Lack of will among member states, consistently seeing women's participation as 
not a priority, institutionalised sexism and patriarchal cultural mores remain 
major obstacles in translating the grand rhetoric of Resolution 1325 into practical 
reality. To include women in political decision-making in transitional societies is 
to take seriously gender justice, gender equality, women's human rights and the 
rebuilding of relationships in formerly militarised societies. 
Peace-building is a process that is important in pre-conflict, conflict and post­
conflict stages in both formal and informal settings. Practical peace-building 
must be truly inclusive of women and men from all branches of life. The 2005 
World Summit Document commits states "to fully and effectively implement 
Security Council Resolution 1325" . This commitment must translate into reality. 
This article by Elisabeth Porter was originally published on openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons 
Licence. If you enjoyed this article, visit openDemocracy.net for more. 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ democracy-resolution 1325 /dance 293.jsp 
1 Katharine Houreld, I am woman, hear my roar (2005) Open Democracy
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/ debates/ article.jsp ?id =3&debateld =130&articleld =2903> 
2 UNIFEM 'Experts Visit Colombia as Part of Global Assessment on the Impact of War on Women and
Women's Roles in Peace-Building' (News Release, 26 November 2001) 
<http:/ /www.unifem.org/news_events/story_detail.php?StoryID=74> 
Women and Religion in the Legal System of Brunei Darussalam 
Dr Ann Black 
This article is an abridged version of a chapter ' Islamisation, Modernity and Re-positioning of 
women in Brunei' in Amanda Whiting & Carolyn Evans (eds) Mixed Blessings: Laws, Religions 
and Women's Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, published by Koninklijke Brill NV in 2006. 
Dr Ann Black currently teaches Criminal Law, Introduction to Islamic Law and Asian Legal 
Systems at the University of Queensland. She completed an SJD on dispute resolution in Brunei 
Darussalam. Research interests include the law and legal culture of Asia, criminal law, Islamic 
law and legal education. She is a co-author of the text - Legal Studies for Queensland, Val I & II. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since achieving independence in 1984, the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam 
("Brunei, the Abode of Peace") has been seeking to define its own particular 
national identity, while striving to be a leading nation amongst the states of Asia. 
The abundant political rhetoric announcing these dual aims is supported by 
strategies for practical implementation, and concrete initiatives in both directions 
are evident. To construct its national identity Brunei has implemented a national 
ideology, Melayu Islam Beraja (known as MIB) which translates as Malay, Islam, 
Monarchy. This ideology permeates every aspect of life in the Sultanate. To 
become a leading state in Asia in political 1 as well as economic2 terms, Brunei 
has used its petro-carbon derived wealth to improve the living standards of its 
people (currently second only to Japan in the region), has embraced high 
technology, and has been positioning itself as a leading banking and financial 
centre. However, there is a tension inherent in these choices: one path follows the 
route of modernisation and development, in line with the forces of 
globalisation;3 while the other charts a return to traditional Malay customs and 
In 1984, Brunei joined the following organizations: ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations); ARF (Asean Regional Forum.); APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation, as a founding 
member); ASEM (Asia European Meeting ); PECC (Pacific Economic Co-operation Council). In 
2000, Brunei hosted the annual APEC meeting. Brunei is a member of the Commonwealth of 
Nations, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It is also a 
member of Islamic bodies such as OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) and !SESCO (Islamic 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation). 
The Eighth National Development Plan in 2001 was designed to diversify the economy away from 
dominance of the oil and gas sectors, towards tourism and establishing Brunei as an offshore 
financial centre. The difficulty for Brunei in promoting itself as an International Financial Centre is 
that it has to compete with nearby Labuan (in Malaysia) as well as Singapore and Hong Kong. 
A prevailing view in Southeast Asia is that modernisation inevitably means westernisation or 
globalisation. See Edwin Thumboo, "Introduction" in Cultures in ASEAN and the 2151 Century, ed. 
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practices, a re-assertion of Islam as a religious and legal priority, and an 
endorsement of an undemocratic political regime. 
The position of women in the Sultanate reflects the duality of national purpose. 
On the one hand, this is a time when women in Brunei have access to free 
education to tertiary level, are able to engage in a wide range of professional 
occupations and in business, have a free and internationally accepted high 
standard of health care, have comparatively high disposable incomes and are not 
subject to the social restrictions which occur in regions with purdah or women's 
seclusion zones. These benefits are the result of the nation's commitment to 
modernisation, national unity and economic development. However, these same 
Bruneian women are disenfranchised 4 and, if Muslim, are subject to the 
Sultanate's recently implemented policy designed for the ' Islamisation' of laws 
and legal institutions. 
Islamisation is the process by which a society, generally with State support, and 
in line with Islamic rival and resurgence elsewhere in the Muslim world,5 seeks 
to reassert its Islamic identity. It does so by according greater importance to 
designated Islamic laws, institutions, values and practices than has previously 
been the case.6 Given the centrality of law, described as the 'the core and kernel 
of Islam itself,' 7 it is axiomatic that re-establishing Islamic law and legal 
institutions would be required by this direction. Given that women are seen as 
the symbolic role bearers of a society's cultural and religious values and 
traditions, 8 it was inevitable that women's roles and gender identity would be 
integral to the process. This is where law and religion directly intersect the lives 
of Muslim women in the Sultanate today. 
Edwin Thumboo (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1996), xx. 
There have been no elections in Brunei Darussalam since 1962 when the state of emergency was 
declared . The Constitution of 1959 gave legislative authority to a Legislative Council, but Parts VI 
and VII of the Constitution, which set out the form and procedure for the Legislative Council, 
continued to be ' temporarily suspended' in the 1984 Revised Constitution at independence. 
A lthough the Sultan re-convened the Legislative Council in September, 2004, all of its 21 members 
were appointed. The Sultan has foreshadowed that there will be a minority of elected members (15 
elected and 30 appointed) in the next Legislative Council though the time frame and details for an 
election have not been announced. However, as Ranjit Singh notes 'even if the Constitution was to 
operate in toto, the delegation of powers and functions to the various bodies is a fac;ade'. See DS 
Ranjit-Singh, "Executive Power and Constitutionalism in ASEAN States: the Brunei Experience," in 
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, ed. Carmelo V. Sison (Manila: Academy of 
ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, 1990), 42. 
Obaid ul Haq, 'Islamic Resurgence: the Challenge of Change' in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, 
ed. Taufik Abdullah & Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 332. 
Chandra Muzaffar, "Islamisation of State and Society: Some Further Critical Remarks" in Shari'a 
Law and the Modern Nation State: A Malaysian Symposium, ed. Norani Othman ( SIS Forum 
(Malaysia) Berhad, Kuala Lumpur: SIS Forum, 1994), 1 13. 
Joseph Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 1. 
This is a theme developed by Modhadarn and is discussed later in this chapter. See Valentine M. 
Moghadam, ed . Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International 
Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 
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The path of Islamisation has even wider ramifications, as it also impacts upon the 
women in the Sultanate who are not Muslim, including the indigenous non­
Malays. While section 3 of the Constitution allows for other religions to be 
practiced in 'peace and harmony', law and policy informed by MIB act in 
practice to restrict the religious practices of the non-Malays. With strong 
government support for a robust Melayu masuk (becoming Malay) agenda, the 
result is that there are powerful disincentives for non-Malay women to freely 
adhere to their religious practices and to transmit these to their children. The 
steady numbers of indigenous non-Malays who are being absorbed, though 
Islamic conversion, into the Malay mainstream highlight the powerful mix that 
law and religion can exert over vulnerable and indigenous minorities. 
ISLAMISATION IN BRUNEI: CONSEQUENCES FOR MUSLIM WOMEN 
Why Islamisation? 
For almost 100 years, Brunei straddled two cultures as well as two systems of 
law. This duality was the legacy of the competing and complementary forces that 
had interacted there over the preceding century. Once able to chart its own 
course in the post-Independence era, the Brunei government re-evaluated this 
legacy and decided to reclaim what it saw to be its own unique Bruneian 
identity. This gave rise to the ideology of MIB. This state ideology provided a 
map for conceptualising and rationalising what should be the desirable values 
and priorities in public and private life, as well as in economic and non-economic 
life. Being so small in size, population and infrastructure, this became imperative 
not only because of the colonial inheritance and the dominance of English laws 
and institutions, but also because of the continuing hegemony of Western values 
and practices. MIB was to be the filter through which such offerings from the 
West would be accepted or rejected. Whilst detractors contended that MIB was 
invented to sanctify the consolidation of absolute political, economic and 
spiritual power in the hands of the current Sultan and a self-consolidating elite,9 
there is no doubt that the state ideology drew on three components - Malay 
culture, Islam, and the Monarchy - that had been dominant in shaping pre­
colonial Bruneian institutions, practices and sense of identity. Just as official state 
ideology has been used in other post-colonial Asian nations,10 MIB was 
G. Braighlinn, Ideological Innovation under Monarchy: Aspects of Legitimation Activity in Contemporary 
Brunei (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992). 
10 Indonesia has the Pancasila, Malaysia has Rukun Negara with its 'the Four Pillars', and Singapore 
promulgates Confucianism as defining its national values. 
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employed to maintain cohesion within Brunei society against further inroads 
from monolithic western, democratic and secular culture. 
At the heart of MIB is Islam. This is not Islam is the narrow sense of "religion" 
that is employed in secular countries. Siddique explains that the inadequacy in 
seeking to understand Islam as merely a religion is that it leaves unanalysed 
Islam's political, economic, legal and social aspects. 1 1  He argues that Muslims do 
not conceptualise Islam in terms of Western, and thus Christian, derived 
sociological categorization of religion, which inevitably places the individual at 
the centre of all analysis. Rather than a focus on the personal relationship 
between God and the individual, Islam's mission extends beyond the individual 
dimension to direct all economic, political and legal processes towards an entire 
Islamic social order . 12 Whilst Islamisation occurred across many aspects of life in 
the Sultanate, the Islamic blueprint for life meant that there were to be 
consequences for women in the Sultanate. 
Brunei's Model of Islamisation 
Islamisation is not a uniform process whereby the same model is replicated in 
each nation that reaffirms its national commitment to implement Islamic law. 
Whether it is Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria or Indonesia, the re-affirmation of 
commitment to Islam occurs but the re-assertion of each Islamic identity in 
distinctive and culturally specific. Throughout the twentieth century there have 
been different interpretations of the sources of Islamic law, as some scholars 
challenge restrictive interpretations whilst others passionately confirm the 
veracity of orthodox fiqh in the respective schools. Integral to choice between 
orthodox 13 and modernist14 interpretations of Islam is the issue of gender 
differentiation, or, more precisely, inequality, between men and women in 
Islamic law. If the country pursues that mode of Islamisation which adopts 
literalist, patriarchal or Arabic interpretations of Islamic law, the consequence 
will be increased differentiation of women's rights, duties and entitlements from 
those of men. It also would countermand those aspects of modernization based 
on contemporary internationally-derived conceptions of gender equality and of 
women's inherent rights, as declared by the United Nation's Charter and the 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Sharon Siddique, "Conceptualizing Contemporary Islam: Religion or Ideology?" in Readings on 
Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique & Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 338. 
Ibid, 338. 
Orthodoxy can be defined as doctrine embodied in the Syariah around the tenth century AD. It 
refers to Sunni doctrines of belief and practice. The orthodox view does not seek to compete or be 
compared with West but aims to preserve the status quo to safeguard Islam and Islamic law. 
Modernism proposes that Islam can be interpreted in a way that is dynamic, modem and able to 
compete with Western secularism with no sacrifice of its essentially Islamic character. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well the specific Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) . 
Brunei chose the orthodox path to Islamisation. However it permitted some 
modifications, in acknowledgment of strong arguments from modernist Islam 
and in deference to its own modernization agenda more generally. Whilst Brunei 
did not become a signatory to CEDA w,1s it did endorse the equality of women in 
the economic and educational and vocational spheres. At the same time, it 
rejected Western style equality in matters pertaining to the family, such as 
marriage, divorce, custody, succession and in the law of evidence. In keeping 
with MIB, the nation wanted to retain and 'tighten' the Islamic model of laws for 
family relations so that the law reflected the orthodox position of the Shafi'i 
school. This, it was argued, was in keeping with the significance of Islamic family 
law for most Muslims. As one of the few remaining components of Islamic law 
preserved through the colonial era, family law was the symbol of the Syariah in 
the Sultanate. As well, Poulter notes that many Muslims sincerely believe that 
the best way to preserve their own families from what are seen as the corrupting 
forces and 'evils' in Western societies - prostitution, pornography, child abuse, 
abortion, marital breakdown, extra-marital affairs, single mothers, same-sex 
relationships, neglect of the elderly - is to operate on the scale of family values 
embodied in Islamic law . 16 This perspective is reflected in Brunei, where it is 
frequently argued at official and popular levels that such social ills will be 
reduced by 'tightening religious laws' 17 and when Islam assumes a greater role 
in Brunei. 18 
In taking this course, there was acceptance of the validity of those orthodox 
interpretations of the primary sources of Islamic law - the Qur' an and Sunnah 
- regarding the differential rights and obligations of men and women in Islamic 
family law. At the same time, there was sensitivity to transnational discourse and 
to international movements that demanded an end to religious laws and 
customary practices that treated women and men unequally. Brunei's solution 
was to adhere to orthodoxy, but to modify particular components in order to 
avoid perceived, or actual, injustice to women. Such compromises are a recurring 
theme throughout the new legislation on family relationships. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Other Muslim countries who refrained from signature/ratification of the Convention include 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Mauritania, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Iran, Kazakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria and the UEA. 
Ibid, 147. 
Mohamad Yusop bin Awang Damit "Negara Brunei Darussalam: Light at the End of the Tunnel" 
Southeast Asian Affairs (2002): 81. 
Malai Hassan Othman "Increasing Social Ills Jolt Religious Authorities into Action" Brudirect 
News: www.brudirect,com/Dailylnfo/News/Archive/Oct02/051002/nite01 .htm; CT Haji 
Mahmod, "Public awareness in a Caring Society," Borneo Bulletin, 31 October, 2002. 
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The Brunei Compromise 
The ways in which Brunei has retained but modified the orthodox Shafi'i school 
of Islamic law to reduce the unfairness to women illustrates both Brunei's form 
of Islamisation and its selective modernisation. The modifications to the laws 
dealing with marriage are quite minor, but they still provide some safeguards 
against what could be unreasonable outcomes for women. Polygyny is a case in 
point. Although the term polygamy is used in the English version of the Islamic 
Family Law Order (1999), it is technically only polygyny19 that is lawful in Brunei. 
In the Order, the classic Sunni right of a husband to four simultaneous 
marriages20 has been retained. Although the number 'four' is not actually 
specified, the phrase 'in accordance with the hukum Syara' (Islamic law) allows 
for this. But there is a modification. Now, additional marriages can only occur 
with the written permission of a Syar' ie judge21 According to section 23(2) of the 
Order, this may be granted after the judge has reviewed the husband's  
application stating why the polygynous marriage is  'just and necessary,' and also 
stating the husband's 'present income', 'current ascertainable financial 
obligations and liabilities', the 'number of dependents as a result of the proposed 
marriage' and whether the 'consent or views of the existing wife' have been 
obtained. 
Through this modification, Brunei has adopted a compromise position on a law 
that has engendered considerable debate in Muslim countries, and been the 
subject of considerable advocacy by Islamic women's organisations because of its 
differential treatment between men and women. Although not widespread, 
polygyny is accepted and condoned in Brunei. In the last two years, there had 
been 164 applications submitted to the court. It is probable that if living 
standards continue to improve, so will the polygyny rate,22 since multiple wives 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Polygyny is one category of polygamous marriage . It allows for a husband to have more than one 
wife at the same time, and is contrasted with polyandry which allows for a woman to have more 
than one husband. Polyandry is prohibited in Islam. 
Surah 4:3 " . . .  then marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if you fear 
that you will not do justice (between them), then (marry) only one . . .. ". Polygyny is also supported 
by the Prophet's own sunnah of marrying more than one wife. 
Islamic Family Law Order (1999) s 23. If a marriage occurs without permission a $2000 fine or 
imprisonment for 6 months can be imposed. It has been noted in Malaysian states with similar 
provisions that some men contract polygynous marriages without court permission and simply 
pay the fine and retrospectively register the marriage, obviating the need to make a court 
application. See Nik Noriani Nik Badlishah, 'Country Report Malaysia: Polygamy' at Sisters in 
Islam, 'Report on Regional Workshop and Justice for Muslim Women', held Kuala Lumpur, 8-10 
June, 2001 .  http:/ /www.sistersinislam.org .my /reports/810_062001.htm # source- SIS? . Also
Recent Bruneian legislation uses the term Syar'ie judge in its official English version which is a 
variation on Syariah judge. 
Gavin W Jones, Marriage and Divorce in Islamic South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
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can be a status factor for men and symbol of wealth. As the male members of 
Royal family, including the Sultan, have married more than one wife, there is no 
overt or public criticism of the practice. However, the Malaysian based women's 
organisation Sisters in Islam argues that Muslim women should be empowered 
to curtail the practice by being made aware at the time of marriage of the option 
to stipulate in their marriage contract a condition that legally binds a husband 
not to take a second wife during the duration of their marriage.23 In some Islamic 
nations, such as Iran, such clauses are a standard feature of marriage agreements. 
Brunei has an integrated, well educated, relatively affluent, skilled or 
professionalised female population. In such a context, the retention of the legal 
requirement for a woman to have the consent of a male marriage guardian ( wali) 
for the marriage to be valid demonstrates the continuing priority given to 
Shafi'i24 orthodoxy in the Sultanate. This is especially so given that it is not a 
Quranic requirement, but one based a hadith of the Prophet25which coincided 
with existing patriarchal customary practices Islam encountered as it spread 
through the Middle- East, Africa, and Asia. Getting her wali's 26consent means 
permission from her father, paternal grandfather, brother or other male relative 
(determined in the order of agnatic inheritance laws) . A woman cannot perform 
the role of a wali. 
As with polygyny, Brunei has adopted a compromise position in relation to the 
function of the wali. If her wali 'refuses to give his consent without reasonable 
grounds'27 a woman can go to the Syariah Court where a wali Hakim (a Syar'ie 
judge who inquires into the issue of consent) will be appointed. Of course, the 
gender differentiation remains. A women's consent to marriage still requires 
validation by a man, either by her wali or wali Hakim, whereas there is no such 
limitation on men, who, regardless of age at the time28 are legally able to give 
their own consent to a marriage contract. It arguable that this provision is 
difficult to justify in present day Brunei, where the educational standard, 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Press, 1994), 271 and Jamila Hussain, Islamic law and Society (Leichhardt: Federation Press, 1999), 73. 
"Add no-polygamy clause in marriage contract, says SIS" in Star News, 18 January 2003 at: 
www.polygamyinfo.com/ intnalmedia %20plyg %20168star.htm. 
The Hanafi school does not have this requirement. 
'Take ye care that none contract women in marriage but their proper guardians, and that they be 
not so contracted but with their equals' cited in Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and human rights in 
Islam and International law: equal before Allah, unequal before man ? (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), 164. 
Section 12 (a) Emergency (Islamic Family Law) Order (1999). 
Section 12 (b) Emergency (Islamic Family Law) Order (1999). 
The new Order does not establish a legal age for marriage between Muslims. Thus the classic 
Syariah position applies that a person of either sex who has reached puberty can consent to 
marriage. The general marriage age under civil legislation in Brunei is 13 years, but data from the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs for 2000 shows that there were just eight girls under 15 who were 
married and that the most popular age was 20 -29 years. Ignatus Stephen, "Brunei's 14-year Itch 
Causes Marriage Breaks" at www.brudirect.com/Dailylnfo/News/ Archive/Jan03/200103.02.htm. 
20 
economic independence and employment rates for women are comparable to 
those of men, and where, furthermore, child marriages are relatively rare. 29 On 
this basis, Islamic reformers such as Norma Maruhom3° question the need for 
continuing patriarchal assumptions about a woman's inability to make decisions 
about her life. 
One aspect of Islamic family law where there has been major modification of the 
orthodox position is talaq divorce. This is also possibly the most criticised aspect 
of Islamic family law in the West, because talaq divorce gives a husband alone the 
unilateral right to extrajudicial divorce, without cause, simply through the 
pronouncement of one, two or three talaqs (statements of intention to divorce) . 31 
Although the Quran was progressive in its time by providing divorce options for 
wives, the fact that a talaq divorce was the preserve of a husband has been 
condemned in the present day as discriminatory. This is so because, in 
comparison with the ease by which a husband may initiate a talaq divorce, a wife 
must attend a court and convince a judge that she had genuine grounds for 
divorcing her husband; otherwise she faces the difficult task of buying her way 
out of the marriage.32 
What the new Order has done is to abolish the unilateral and extrajudicial 
components of talaq divorce. Now, either husband or wife can present an 
application for talaq divorce to the Court, setting down the reasons for the 
application and particulars of the marriage.33 This is a radical reform. Other 
aspects of the talaq law are retained, in that it remains a revocable divorce 
requiring a period of time iddah (three menstrual cycles)34 in which it is possible, 
and in fact encouraged, that there be ruju, or reconciliation. Both husband and 
wife will be counselled by a Family Adviser to 'achieve a reconciliation' and 
'resume conjugal relations' 35 and the traditional role laid down in the Qur'an36 
for family members to act as arbiters for both sides (hakam) is also retained .  
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Sisters in Islam, 'Report on Regional Workshop and Justice for Muslim Women', held Kuala 
Lumpur, 8-10 June, 2001. http:/ /www.sistersinislam.org.my /reports/810_062001.htm 
After three talaqs there can be no reconciliation and remarriage to each other unless the wife has an 
intervening marriage. Quran , surah 2:229. 
In khulu or cerai tebus talaq (divorce by redemption) a wife with the court's permission could buy 
her way out of an unhappy marriage by returning the marriage gift to her husband. It could be a 
severe financial impost because she lost not only her marriage gift but could lose maintenance 
entitlement. 
Islamic Family Law Order (1999), s 42. After the application, the court serves a summons on the other 
party and a copy of the application and requires both to appear before the court. If the other party 
consents to the divorce and the court is 'satisfied that the marriage has irretrievably broken down', 
the judge will advise the husband to pronounce talaq before the court. 
Per the Quranic requirement in 2:228: 'Divorced women shall wait concerning themselves for three 
monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for them to hide what God Hath created in their wombs, if they 
have faith in God and the Last Day. And their husbands have the better right to take them back in 
that period, if they wish for reconciliation.' 
Emergency (Islamic Family Law) Order (1999), s 41 (10). 
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Despite the significance of this reform of talaq divorce, which would seem to 
obviate the need for other Islamic divorce procedures, these other forms are all 
retained essentially unchanged from their classic form. One inexplicable 
provision, given the seemingly progressive nature of the reform, is the inclusion 
in the Order of zihar. This is a virtually extinct Arabian (and pre-Islamic) form of 
divorce not used elsewhere in South-East Asia37 
WOMEN AS THE TRANSMITTERS OF CULTURE AND RELIGION 
Where there is a context of "intensification of religious, cultural, ethnic and 
national identity' as is occurring in Brunei, researchers such as Moghadam argue 
that there will inevitably be a 'politization of gender, the family and the position 
of women' . 38 Thus women become important achieving the new Bruneian 
national identity. With Brunei's articulated national identity centred on Islam 
and Malay culture, it is inevitable that the idealised woman is the embodiment of 
Muslim Malay identity. Within this Muslim Malay ideology, "virtue" is 
considered integral to the relationship between husband and wife and supports 
the longstanding cultural and legal requirement that a wife be obedient to her 
husband. This ideal of loyal and obedient wife and good mother then mirrors the 
ideal relationship between caring ruler and loyal obedient subject. 
The requirement for loyalty and obedience is reinforced by the Islamic legal 
concept of nusyuz (disobedience, not fulfilling one's marital duties) . For a 
husband, nusyuz is failing to maintain and support his wife; for a wife, it is her 
refusal to obey her husband's  lawful wishes or commands. It arises from one of 
most debated verses in the Quran - Surah 4:34. 39 The orthodox interpretation 
36 Surah 4:35. On Islamic arbitration in Brunei see Ann Black , "Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Brunei Darussalam: the Blending of Imported and Traditional Processes" Bond Law Review(2001): 
305. 
37 It comes from the pre-Islamic practice among Arabs to degrade their wives by declaring them 'like 
their mothers', in the sense of being prohibited to them sexually, and then abandon them, but on 
occasions return to them later. Zihar is mentioned in two verses of the Qur' an (33:4 and 58:2-3) 
which stipulate that if men declare their wives like their mothers and abandon them, they can not 
return to them until they have freed a slave. Modem jurists have argued that as such practices do 
not exist in other Islamic societies, and furthermore as today there is no institution of slavery, 
therefore zihar should be treated considered to have no contemporary application. More orthodox 
jurists hold that instead of freeing a slave, a husband can fast 'for two consecutive months' as a 
form of atonement or proceed with divorcing his wife by statements of zihar. 
38 Valentine M Moghadam, ed, Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in 
International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 18. 
39 'Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more 
(strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. 
Therefore righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's absence) what 
Allah would have them guard. 
As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), 
22 
has been that Allah has given men authority and control over women and so 
women are to be obedient to men - be they husbands, fathers or brothers. It also 
has been interpreted to allow for (mild) physical punishment to be given to a 
disobedient woman. 
The new Order in Brunei retains the legal categorisation of nusyuz. 40 Not only is 
it an offence for a wife to 'wilfully disobey an order by her husband in 
accordance with Hukum Syara '41 but she faces the consequence that by refusing 
'to obey the lawful wishes or commands of her husband', she may lose her basic 
entitlement to maintenance from her husband. 42 The notion of 'disobedience' can 
refer a range of behaviour and attitudes, such as a wife's refusal to respect her 
husband's directives regarding whether or not she work, or his sexual 'wishes 
and commands' . In keeping with the reforming pattern already established, the 
determination of nusyuz no longer remains at the husband's discretion alone, but 
is to be decided on the advice of the Syar' ie judge. 
In a similar way, the laws of custody and guardianship reflect the significance of 
women as transmitters of values and culture to their children and nation. The 
importance of transmitting Islamic values and practices is seen in laws dealing 
with custody of young (mumaiyiz)43 children during marriage and after 
dissolution. Custody is given to the mother at least until the child attains 
puberty; however, a woman can lose custody if her role as transmitter of proper 
values becomes suspect. Hence the Order provides that if she remarries, 44 is of 
bad conduct in a 'gross and open manner', changes her place of residence so as to 
make it difficult for the father to exercise necessary supervision of his child, 
neglects or abuses the child or becomes an apostate, 45 then custody will be lost. 
The inclusion of apostasy as an automatic ground for losing custody of one's 
child shows the significance of the mother as the transmitter of Islam and its 
practices, ethos and values . 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not 
against them means (of annoyance): for Allah is Most High, Great (above you all). 
An outline of arguments in this debate on interpreting 4: 23 can be found in Shaheen Sardar Ali, 
Gender and Human Rights, 63-70. 
It should be noted that disobedience is a separate legal category from ill-treatment of a husband or 
of a wife. The new order makes 'ill-treatment' an offence where either spouse is found by a court to 
'ill-treat her husband or wife'. 
The section provides an escalating scale of punishment: the nusyuz wife is liable to a fine not
exceeding $500 for the first conviction, and $1000 for any subsequent offences. 
Islamic Family Law Order (1999), s 61. 
Defined as a 'child unable to differentiate a matter' but in practice means a child who has not 
attained puberty. Generally in Islamic law this is considered about 9 years of age. 
Section 90 (a) where the man she marries is not related to the child 'thereby prohibiting him from 
marrying the child'. 
These are contained in s90 (b) - (e). 
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The role of women in Brunei's Islamisation agenda 
To what extent can Burneian women participate in the debates and institutions 
shaping the national priorities and laws that govern their lives and relationships? 
In general, women in Brunei have not participated in this discourse, though there 
is a pervasive acceptance at official, and also individual level, that Islamisation 
was welcomed and is appreciated by all Brunei Muslims. 
Islamisation was first enunciated in broad statements in titahs of the Sultan and 
in speeches by his Ministers, which were then transmitted to Bruneians through 
reposts in the mass media. The details of what would be entailed in the 're­
enactment of the Syariah judicial system' were never publicly clarified. Without 
parliamentary debate, 46 without effective political parties, 47 without 'green 
papers' enabling a community consultative processes, the women of Brunei had 
no input into the legislative agenda that would impact directly upon their lives. 
Unlike their Muslim counterparts in Malaysia and Indonesia, the women of 
Brunei are denied a vote and thus a voice - either in support or in rejection - of 
social and legal Islamisation. Whilst this is true for men (who were also 
disenfranchise since the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1962) the 
significance for women has been greater, as the authoritarian and paternalistic 
nature of the political process ensured the perpetuation of male discourse and 
dominance. This is because there are almost no women's voices in the corridors 
of powers. The appointment of 21 men as the 21 members of the 2004 
reconstituted Legislative Council re-enforces this view. There are no female 
Ministers in Cabinet and few in the higher echelons of government. Except for a 
handful of Permanent Secretaries and a female ambassador (the Sultan's sister, 
HRH Princess Hajah Masna) the steering of the government is in male hands. In 
keeping with the dominance of the Royal family in public life, 4s the women 
selected to speak publicly on behalf of the women of Brunei are typically 
members of the Sultan's family. 49 Women too are absent from the consultative 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Parliament has not met since 1962. Brunei has remained in a state of Emergency since that time. 
Brunei's two registered political parties, Brunei National Solidarity Party (PPKB) and the People's 
Awareness Party (P AKAR) have had dwindling memberships down to less than 100 members . 
Whilst the PPKB has been gently advocating democratic reform it was cautious to not want 
'anything that is outside MIB'. See Rosli Abidin Yahya, "Brunei's Political Scene in Disarray 
following Mass Resignations" News Express, February 24, 2001. However, the recent reconstitution 
of the Legislative Council and the official statements that in future there may be elections for 
additional members to join the appointed and nominated members on the Council, may serve to 
revive these parties. Political debate may also be stimulated. Government regulations forbid public 
servants from becoming members of political parties even if the parties recognize the supremacy of 
the institution of monarchy. See: B. A. Hussainrniya, Brunei Darussalam: A Nation at Peace at 
http://www.niu.edu/ cseas/ outreach/bruneipaper.htm 
The Sultan is also the nation's Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance, Chancellor 
of the national University, Superintendent General of the Royal Brunei Police Force, and leader of 
the Islamic faith. 
For example: HRH Princess Hajah Masna presented the report for Brunei at the APEC Second 
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process set up in 1992, known as 'grass-roots democracy,' through which 
government decisions are explained to the people and popular responses are 
received back by government. 50 The village elected headmen (ketau kampong), 
who are given the role of government 'mediating agents' 51 are also male. 
One of the repercussions of Brunei's lack of democracy is that vigorous debate on 
matters of faith, law and social policy, and gender issues does not occur; or, if it 
does, this is never made public. Again, this situation stands in contrast with 
neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia, where Muslim women can, and do, use 
the political process directly, and where they use women's organisations to 
project a voice that reaches both the public and the government. Such women's 
voices are missing from Brunei. Apart from restrictions on political parties and 
activities52 there is no prohibition on such discourse. But it seems there is a 
culture self-censorship, in which adherence to MIB has become the major test of 
citizen loyalty. 53 
The absence of effective political parties and women's organisations to express 
opposition or alternative views on women's issues is compounded by the 
media's compliance with the government. The licensing requirements for locally 
printed newspapers, as well as the unfettered power of the Minister for Home 
Affairs to refuse or revoke printing permits and to prevent overseas publications 
from entering Brunei, means that only those views are aired that uncritically 
accord with MIB, and thus with the government's particular Islamisation policy. 
Even the advent of the Internet and its on-line chatrooms, such as BruNet, has 
not allowed for totally open political debate and commentary. If postings are too 
critical of the government the lines are closed down. Press54 and media 
censorship silences women's (and men's) views that may dissent, question, or 
challenge any aspect of three tenets of MIB. The consequence for Bruneian 
Ministerial Meeting on Women, Mexico, September 2002. 
so A. Mani, "Negara Brunei Darussalam in 1992: Celebrating the Silver Jubilee" Southeast Asian Affairs 
(1993) 99. Also Mark Cleary & Shuang Yann Wong, Oil, Economic Development and Diversification in 
Brunei Darussalam (London: St Martins Press, 1994) 126. 
51 BA Hussainmiya, "Philosophy for a Rich, Small State" Far Eastern Economic Review 10 February 
1994, 31 .  District officer, Dato Paduka Hj Dani outlined their role as ensuring 'harmony and peace 
is attained in their respective communities', listening 'carefully to grievances', and 'implementing 
government guidelines and policies at the grass root level'- see Bahreen Hamzah, "New Village 
Heads Appointed," Sunday Borneo Bulletin 28 January, 2001. 
52 See n 95 and Rosli Abidin Yahya, "Brunei's Political Scene in Disarray following Mass 
Resignations," News Express February 24, 2001. 
53 " Negara Brunei Darussalam in 1991: Relegitimising Tradition" Asian Survey 32 (1992:2)128. 
54 All newspapers must be owned and all directors of a newspaper company must be Brunei citizens 
or permanent residents. Publication can only occur with a government permit is required which 
requires payment of B$100,000. There is self-censorship anyway as the Sultan's brother Prince 
Mohamed's QAF Group owns the Borneo Bulletin. The Sultan's other brother Prince Sufri is a 
partner in the Company that owns the News Express. See Ray Mitton, "Waiting for Dawn," Asiaweek 
(August 1999):17 . More strident censorship is through the Undesirable Publications Act (1982), 
Censorship of Films and Public Entertainments Act (1962) and the Internal Security Act (1960). 
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women is explained by Moghissi who argues that the absence of a truly free 
press and independent media allows a male-serving value system to decide what 
comes to public attention. 55 
This acquiescence of Brunei women to government policy and apparent 
acceptance of Islamisation as being in their best interests has meant that the stage 
appears set for the introduction of Syariah criminal law. The implications of this 
would be very serious for Brunei's women, if the experience of women in nations 
where it is currently in force (such as Pakistan, Sudan and the northern states of 
Nigeria) is any indication. Unlike Islamic family law, Islamic criminal law and its 
controversial and very harsh punishments have not been a part of Brunei's legal 
tradition. Paving the way for this possible new phase of Islamisation was the 
Syariah Courts Evidence Order (2001), which is already in force in Brunei. This 
Order stipulates the number and gender requirements of witnesses in particular 
hudud offences. For example, a conviction for zina requires evidence of four male 
syahid;56 for theft, highway robbery, false accusations and consuming alcohol, 
evidence of two male syahid is needed57 whilst corroboration of wealth requires 
three male syahids. 58 The Order makes the classic distinction between bayyinah 
and syahadah evidence with women (and non-Muslims) excluded from giving 
syahadah evidence, except in matters pertaining to designated women's issues: 
'matters relating to menstruation, birth, breastfeeding and of embarrassment to a 
female' .59 Additionally, the principle that the evidence of a woman is weighted 
at half that of a man prevails through the Order, since, with the exception of 
those offences specifically referred to,60 syahadah evidence shall be given by two 
male syahid or one male and two female syahid. 
The prospect of introducing Islamic criminal law concerns many non-Muslims in 
the Sultanate, including the indigenous non-Malays who already feel their 
traditional practices, religion and way of life is threatened by the committed 
policy of Islamisation. 
IMPACT OF ISLAMISATION ON NON-MALAY INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
OF BRUNEI 
Although non-Muslims in Brunei are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Syariah 
Court and to the specific statutes discussed above, 61 the impact of Islamisation 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (London: ZED Books, 1999) 82. 
Syahids are persons the court finds are able to give syahadah evidence, Syariah Courts Evidence Order 
(2001), s 106(1) 
Syariah Courts Evidence Order (2001), s 106(3) 
Syariah Courts Evidence Order (2001), s 106(2) 
Syariah Courts Evidence Order (2001), s 106(5) 
Section 106 (1 )-(5) 
This is in general terms as non-Muslims can be called to give bayyinah evidence in the Syariah 
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reaches all residents in the Sultanate. This is because the aim of MIB is to 
promote one culture (Malay) and one religion (Islam) . The ethnic and religious 
diversity that was apparent on the island of Borneo from earliest times is thus 
suppressed, as assimilation into Malay culture is encouraged in order to create a 
mono-cultural Brunei. 
The government acknowledges that Brunei is 'a poly-ethnic society,' but is firm 
in its resolve that the national culture is Malay and the national religion is Islam. 
For the indigenous non-Malays whose culture and religion pre-dates the arrival 
of Islam, the policy of Islamisation threatens the survival of their way of life. For 
these women, it not the intersection of Islamisation with goals of modernisation 
that causes tension, but the impact of Islamisation on their indigenous Bornean 
traditions and spirituality. Their religion extends in a continuum to Borneo's pre­
Islamic, pre-European, animistic way of life. Animism is a system of beliefs used 
to explain the natural world, and how humans should interact with each other 
and with natural phenomena. In the dense and rugged tropical rainforests, the 
early peoples of Borneo constructed a belief system where the natural and 
supernatural merged, and where the souls or spirits of people, animals and the 
deities constantly interacted. The concepts and procedures for the settlement of 
disputes were intimately linked with the spiritual, so that ritual redress 
complemented the secular. Animism supported egalitarian notions including 
gender equality, and relied on established practices for maintaining harmony 
between people and their natural environment. Women were always important 
transmitters of these cultural and religious values and in some cases women 
were bearers of high religious office, mediums for communications with the 
spirit world, and custodians of religious ritual. The Dusun of Brunei is one 
indigenous group where religious leadership was almost exclusively female 
through the belian, or Dusun priestesses. Belian conduct ritual ceremonies and 
perform exorcisms and essentially are the agents of religious transmission. 62 
Despite Constitutional guarantees that 'other religions may be practiced in peace 
and harmony,' there are significant restrictions on the practice of any religion 
other than Islam. However animism which is polytheistic and linked with the 
supernatural spirit world is of particular concern to the authorities in modem 
Brunei, just as it was earlier Muslim leaders, who considered that peoples 
without holy scriptures, the 'non-believers' or kafirs, were not entitled to the 
protections that were afforded dhimmis (people of the book) .63 Given rules for 
62 
63 
Court: Syariah Courts Evidence Order (2001), s 103(2) 
For a detailed study of Dusun religion and in particular the role played by women see: Eva 
Kershaw, A Study of Brunei Dusun Religion: Ethnic Priesthood on a Frontier of Islam (Borneo: Borneo 
Research Monograph Council, 2000) 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Towards an Islamic Reformation: Islamic Law in History and
Society Today" in Othman, Shari'a Law and the Modern Nation State, 17. In orthodox Muslim 
communities the subjects are classified as Muslims, Dhimmis, 'People of the Book' because they 
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modesty in dress, Muslims can be offended by the clothing of indigenous non­
Malay women and find their practices living in longhouses, hunting and eating 
haram foods of concern. In addition, governments in Southeast Asia generally 
consider the indigenous religious practices as primitive or backward, as 
commentators like Winzeler have observed. 64 
There are particular obstacles for the indigenous people of Brunei in retaining 
their own identity and religious practice. The first is the legal categorisation of 
six of the distinctive indigenous ethnic groups as Malay for the purposes of 
Bruneian nationality. 65 By using the legal categorisation of 'Malay,' the Bruneian 
state condescendingly overrules indigenous peoples' adherence to other belief 
systems and ignores their cultural self-identification. 66 
A second repercussion of Islamisation is the barrier it provides to inter-ethnic 
marriage. It impacts upon the indigenous Bruneians because marriage between a 
Muslim and non-Muslim is not lawful until the non-Muslim converts to Islam. 67 
Any children of the marriage are automatically Muslim, thus sealing the end of 
affinity to indigenous religion and culture. This is because the conversion does 
not only mean observance of a new religion, but also: a new identity through the 
taking of an Islamic name;68 changes in outward appearance by the wearing of 
Brunei Malay clothes;69 new daily practices/O dietary change from regular 
consumption of pig to all halal foods; and no alcohol (rice wine is integral to 
many indigenous ceremonies and festivals) . 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
believed in revealed scriptures from God, and kafirs or 'unbelivers . Dhimmis were granted some 
rights of citizenship, provided they paid a special tax (jizyh), and could practice their religion 
provided they did so in private and did not attempt to convert Muslims. They could not hold 
positions of authority over Muslims, Unbelievers had fewer rights and at times were killed unless 
granted safe conduct (aman) by Muslims. 
Robert L Winzeler, ed. Indigenous Peoples and the State: Politics, Land, and Ethnicity in the Malayan 
Peninsula and Borneo (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1997) 12-13 . 
Brunei Nationality Enactment (1961) s4 (1) . The Constitution of Brunei recognized seven indigenous 
ethnic groups as puak jati (original tribes) which includes these six groups plus the Brunei Malays. 
Braighlinn, Ideological Innovation under Monarchy, 19 ascribes to this view, detecting an imputation 
that non-Malay indigenous groups lack 'enough authentic culture or valuable culture to be 
considered anything better than 'sub-groups' of the dominant Malay population.' 
Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act(1984) s 134 required both parties to profess the Islam religion, 
however, The Emergency (Islamic Family Law) Order (1999) s 10 states that: ' A marriage shall be void 
unless all the necessary conditions, in accordance with Hukum Syara ' have been satisfied.' 
Report from Brunei Bulletin 3 June 2000 under 'Two families embrace Islam' states that two Iban 
families from Ulu Belait converted and sets out the new names of each. 'The family of Dyg Kalong 
Anuk Gindau, 43, is now known as Dyg Nur Rashidah bte Abdullah Gindau and her 11 year old 
daughter, Chin Yuk Moi, as Dyg Nurhafizah bte Abdullah.' . 
Dress of tudongs (veils) and angle-length loose gowns for women and girls, and songkit or MIB 
shirts for men. 
A Muslim is required to observe the five pillars of Islam, which include prayers five times a day, 
and fasting during the month of Ramadan, as well as the annual payment of zakat, a pilgrimage to 
Mecca during one's lifetime, and belief in God and Mohammad as his messenger . 
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The third factor that has adverse consequences for the indigenous non-Malays 
and their religion is the law on proselytising. While law is used to prohibit and 
punish the proselytising of any religion other than the Shafi'i sect within Islam, 
there is no prohibition in reverse. In accord with the state ideology of MIB, the 
government actively pursues and funds the propagation of Islam to non­
Muslims. The Islamic Dakwah (Propagation) Centre of the powerful Ministry of 
Religion exists solely for this purpose. A conversion to Islam automatically 
accords the convert Malay status as well as provides tangible benefits, such as 
cash payments,71 promotion at work, grants of land and houses and 
improvements in public works. 72 Representatives from the Dakwah Centre visit 
longhouses and villages, concentrating firstly on obtaining the conversion of the 
headman, and after than the remaining members of the longhouse or village. 
Employers are encouraged to ask non-Muslims if they are planning to convert to 
Islam, and it is not discriminatory for an employer to request that only Malays 
apply. School students are frequently converted to Islam: indeed, once fourteen 
and a half, they can convert without parental consent. All students may attend 
Government schools; but once there, all of them, non-Malays included, must take 
subjects on Islam and MIB and wear Malay dress, including the tudong. There are 
no classes on non-Malay indigenous culture, languages or practices. The steady 
conversion rate73 suggests that the survival of non-Muslim indigenous groups in 
Brunei is precarious. One researcher has predicted that by 2050 all the ethnic 
groups in Brunei will have been converted to Islam and thereby assimilated into 
the official Malay state sponsored culture. 74 
CONCLUSION 
Brunei became independent just twenty years ago, and during that time the 
Sultanate has focused on reclaiming its Islamic Malay identity while striving to 
71 Bernstein, "The De-culturation of the Brunei Dusun", 174 indicates that the figure of B$200 per 
month is given to each convert. 
72 Azaraimy H Hasib also reports that are financial incentives given to new Muslim converts and 
quotes Awang Hj Jaman bin Ali, a Religious Propagation Officer from the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, as stating homes valued at around $42,000 are being built and given to converts in the hope 
of improving 'their well-being and living quality', together with 'water tank supply and power 
generators which may cost around $2500 to $5500 each'. See Azaramy H Hasib, "Brunei Takes 
Giant Strides towards Islamic Conversions" http:/ /www.brudirect.com/Daily Info/News/MarOl. 
Bernstein similarly reports that road and other public improvements do not occur until the 
conversion to Islam of a household, when the work is immediately executed. See Bernstein, "The 
De-culturation of the Brunei Dusun", 174. 
73 In 2000 it was reported that 222 atheists or non-believers (terms used for those adhering to 
indigenous animistic religions) converted to Islam. The figures for 2000 also show that 121 Iban, 
104 Dusuns, and 10 Murut converted. However, it has been suggested by some Than that a
percentage of conversions take place in order to receive the monetary advantage, but in practice, 
earlier beliefs (animistic or of another religion) continue to operate. This is not unlike the notion of 
the 'rice Christian' conversions in Asia. 
74 This is the prediction of Maxwell, cited in Bernstein, "The De-culturation of the Brunei Dusun", 
177. 
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be a modern and influential nation in the region. Modernisation comes in 
different forms, and in Brunei the aim is not to jettison the past and replicate the 
West but to modernise whilst retaining its Islamic and Malay character. 
Similarly, Islamisation, as a re-assertion of Islamic identity, takes distinctive 
cultural and political forms. However, the intersection of the two - Islamic 
resurgence and modernisation - creates inevitable tensions and creative 
solutions. 
In the last decade, the choices the government of Brunei has made for women in 
the Sultanate reflect the inherent tension in reconciling modernisation and 
Islamisation. Three themes have been apparent in this article. One is that women 
themselves have been largely excluded from the debate - they have not informed 
it, nor have they had any decision making role in the choices being made about 
law and religion. In rejecting democracy, Brunei chose not to adopt a key plank 
of the Western modernisation agenda and signalled a leaning to conservative 
Islam. The consequent effect of paternalism for women in Brunei goes beyond 
denying them of a right to vote and to participate in government. It has restricted 
what information can be accessed, what organisations are allowed, and whether 
they can change their religion or practice it openly. 
The second theme relates to choices made in formulating legislation in 
accordance with Islamisation and the extent to which modem concepts -
whether derived from western or international norms or from reformist Islam -
should prevail over the orthodox Shafi'i interpretations. In matters of family law, 
Brunei has essentially retained the orthodox stance but, cognisant of particular 
inequities and wider criticisms, made modifications to reduce injustice. This 
pattern of compromise can be seen in laws on polygyny, wali consent and 
disobedience of a wife. Greatest revision occurred in the case of talaq divorce 
which has been made available to both husband and wife. In contrast, the 
introduction of the pre-Arabic zihar divorce shows the competing influences in 
the sensitive area of family law. Possibly the greater impact of law and religion 
on women in the Sultanate could come if Islamic criminal laws were to be 
introduced. 
The third aspect of the tension between Islamisation and modernisation is the 
impact for indigenous non-Malay women. Those who adhere to their animistic 
beliefs which were essentially egalitarian, some with sacred roles reserved for 
women, find these belittled and under challenge. Modernisation renders their 
religion and way of life 'backward and primitive', being out of keeping with 
modern development in the technological age.  Islamisation, which under MIB 
strives for a monoculture of the Muslim Malay, necessitates the absorption of the 
indigenous Borneans into the dominant Malay, a process which can only occur 
through conversion to Islam. Positive discrimination in favour of the Islam and 
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of the Malay, coupled with inducements to convert and restrictions on other 
religious practices, means the choices for indigenous non-Malay women are 
limited. 
It can be seen that as the Sultanate attempts to reconcile prioritising of Islam with 
the demands of modernisation, women can be caught in conflicting, and 
sometimes, shifting ideological paradigms. Yet it becomes clear that the main 
direction for law and religion in the 21 st century is towards the Islamic world and 
its solutions. In keeping with the tradition attributed to the prophet that 
'whosoever imitates a community, is actually part of it',75 Brunei Darussalam is 
veering away from its inherited secular colonial model to join other Muslim 
states76 on the route to greater Islamisation. 
75 
76 
Ravindra S Khare, Perspectives on Islamic Law, Justice, and Society (Lanham: Rowan & Litt lefield 
Publishers, 1999), 166. 
Islarnisation has been taking place in Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Iran and the Malay states of 
Kelantan. 
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Gender, Sex Work and Law. The impact of a new regulatory regime on 
women workers in the Queensland sex industry 
Dr Barbara Sullivan 
After more than a decade of being a dentist (public health, private practice and Aboriginal 
community-controlled health services), Dr Sullivan commenced studies in politics at Macquarie 
University before moving to the University of Queensland and completing a Masters Qualifying 
and PhD (1 994). She was appointed to the School in 1 993 but also spent 3 years (1994-96) as a 
Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences, Institute of Advanced Studies, 
Australian National University. In 2001 Dr Sullivan was a Visiting Professor at the Centre of 
Criminology, University of Toronto and at the Belle Van Zuylen Institute of Multicultural Gender 
Studies, University of Amsterdam. 
There is little in the way of 'peace' for most workers in the sex industry in the 
world today. The vast majority of sex workers are women and they face hard, 
often daily, battles because of the illegality and stigma associated with their 
work. They are battered, raped and murdered on the streets; harassed and 
arrested by police; fined and imprisoned by courts; evicted by landlords; 
exploited by pimps and traffickers; subjected to forced medical examinations in 
the name of preserving 'public health'; and detained and deported if found 
working outside their country of citizenship. However, like most workers, sex 
workers are merely pursuing a means of supporting themselves and their 
families. 
In Australia over the last two decades there has been a moderate opening in 
some jurisdictions of more space for legal sex work. Brothels may now legally 
operate in Victoria, Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory (subject to various licensing, registration and planning requirements) . 
Escort work is also legal in many jurisdictions and some public soliciting for the 
purposes of prostitution is permitted in New South Wales. This paper explores 
the impact of changes in the state of Queensland and addresses the following 
questions: has the situation of sex workers improved over the last decade? In 
particular, have the human rights and worker rights of women working in 
prostitution been enlarged since the introduction of legal brothels in 1999? The 
overall argument will be that there have been some improvements in the 
situation of sex workers although significant problems remain. Some women are 
now able to work safely and legally in licensed brothels; they are thus free of the 
threat of prosecution and able to receive some of the benefits of mainstream 
work environments (for example, the protections offered by state laws addressed 
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to occupational health and safety in the workplace) . However, in part because of 
the historical legacy of an illegal industry, workers in legal brothels do not enjoy 
adequate rights as workers. Moreover, they are subject to (what is effectively) 
mandatory health testing every six weeks. All the public health literature 
indicates this is both unnecessary and unreasonable; women prostitutes in 
Australia are not key actors in the transmission of disease although they clearly 
bear the burden of our culture's fear of disease, sexuality and 'promiscuous' 
women. The mandatory health testing of sex workers in Queensland is both 
oppressive and actively involved in the stigmatisation of an already marginal 
group if women workers. 
Workers in other areas of the prostitution industry are also not clearly better off 
under the new regime for managing prostitution in Queensland. Private workers 
- who work alone from their own premises - have been legal for many years. 
However, they remain vulnerable to violent clients and newly subject to the 
vagaries of an intense official surveillance of their advertising and policing 
strategies designed to entrap private workers engaged in illegal escort agencies. 
Under the new regime for controlling prostitution, street workers in Queensland 
are also subject to intense policing and significantly increased penalties. 
History of Prostitution in Queensland 
Prostitution has had a long and colourful history in the Queensland context. 
Until the 1990s prostitution law looked similar in Queensland to elsewhere in 
Australia. So, while it was not illegal to practise prostitution, a wide range of 
prostitution-related activities were illegal. For example, it was illegal to solicit in 
a public place for the purposes of prostitution, to own or operate a brothel, or to 
live on the earnings of the prostitution of another. However, brothel prostitution 
was officially 'tolerated' (or 'contained') in Queensland until the late 1950s. This 
involved a police determination of how many brothels would be allowed to 
operate and in what areas. In 1959 Brisbane's tolerated houses of prostitution -
some of which had operated openly for more than a century - were closed down 
by the Police Commissioner. It has been suggested that this was due, not to the 
success of any moral or reform campaign, but to the collapse of long-established 
criminal networks that organised the prostitution industry (see Sullivan 
1997:106-108) . Police were central to the maintenance of this network and the 
brothels were closed to prevent this coming to public attention. In the mid-1980s, 
in the final years of the Bjelke-Petersen government, investigative journalists 
began to expose evidence of police corruption associated with gambling and 
prostitution rackets in Queensland. This eventually led to the establishment of 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 1987 and a wide-ranging investigation which resulted in 
the jailing of a number of high-profile figures including the former 
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Commissioner of Police. Fitzgerald recommended further research and inquiry 
into prostitution and said he thought a system of regulated/ legal prostitution 
would be the best way to prevent this situation arising again. The task of 
inquiring into prostitution and coming up with specific recommendations for 
law reform was given to the newly-formed Criminal Justice Commission (which 
eventually became the Crime and Misconduct Commission, the CMC) . In a 
report published in 1991, the CJC recommended a system of licensed/ legal 
brothels (CJC 1991) .  However, the Goss Labor government declined this 
recommendation and instead introduced a range of new offences and tougher 
penalties for most prostitution-related activities (see Sullivan 1997:208-212) . 
These laws were widely criticised by sex workers, feminists, and activists from 
across the political spectrum. 
The 1999 Prostitution Act 
After the Labor government of Peter Beattie was elected in 1998, new prostitution 
laws were put in place (the Prostitu tion Act of 1999) .  These instituted a system of 
small, 'boutique brothels' to be overseen by an independent statutory authority, 
the Prostitution Licensing Authority (PLA) . Those who want to own or operate a 
legal brothel have to go through an extensive investigation of their background 
and of their associates. The aim was and is to ensure the elimination of criminals 
and criminal networks from the legal prostitution industry in Queensland. 
Brothel owners also have to obtain permission from their local council to develop 
a brothel business and to pay hefty annual license fees (presently in the range of 
$15-20,000 per annum) . Brothels can only be established in industrial areas or 
commercial areas and have to located at a clear distance from homes, schools etc. 
Private workers - who operate alone from their own premises - are not subject to 
licensing and remain legal. Private workers may also do outcalls or escort work 
but this must not be facilitated or supported by any other person - for example, 
by another sex worker, receptionist or driver, or even by a friend looking out for 
the safety of the private worker/ escort. Under the 1999 Act unlicensed brothels, 
escort agencies and all public soliciting for the purposes of prostitution continues 
to be illegal. It is also an offence to provide or receive commercial sex without a 
prophylactic; this applies both to brothels and (since 2003) private workers. 
In December 2004 the CMC reported on its review of the implementation of the 
Prostitution Act of 1 999 and made twenty nine separate recommendations (CMC 
2004) . In 2005 it also investigated and made an interim report on the provision of 
escort services in Queensland (CMC 2005) . There is currently a bill before the 
Queensland parliament - the Prostitution Amendment Bill of 2006 - that takes up 
some of the recommendations contained in both these CMC reports. 
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The Current Regulatory Regime and Its Impact on Sex Workers 
The current regime for regulating prostitution in Queensland presents some 
major problems for sex workers. There are only two ways of working legally - in 
a licensed brothel or as a private worker - and both of these have some major 
disadvantages. Legal brothels do provide the safest working environment for sex 
workers. Workers are not vulnerable to prosecution and are protected by a 
number of proven safety measures including alarms, the presence of other staff 
and general measures required under state laws to achieve Workplace Health 
and Safety (PLA 2004) . However, there are also significant problems with brothel 
employment in Queensland. There will always be some sex workers unable to 
gain employment in this sector of the industry. SSPAN (Sexual Service Providers 
Advocacy Network), which includes members who work in licensed brothels in 
Queensland, has recently claimed that older workers, transgender, male, and 
disabled workers are not hired by brothel owners because they are not seen as 
mainstream/ marketable commodities (SSP AN 2006) . SSPAN has also described 
Queensland' s licensed brothels as "oppressive work environments" (2006:2) .  As 
in Victoria (Murray 2003), workers are paid as independent 'sub-contractors' 
rather than as 'employees' . This means they do not have access to basic 
employment entitlements (including sick leave, recreation leave, employer 
contributions to superannuation etc) and are responsible for paying their own 
tax.88 The CMC recently reported (2004:105) that most brothel owners have: 
contracts with individual workers which state that the worker is an 
independent service provider, that no relationship of employer/ employee 
is created between the parties and that the sex worker is not subject to any 
control by the owner. 
Brothel owners claim this sort of contract reflects the actual organization of the 
work. They say that brothels charge male clients a set fee for the rental of a room 
and that then it is up to the client and the worker to negotiate the services to be 
provided (without any involvement by the management) . However, both the 
CMC and sex workers have disputed this claim. The CMC (2004: 106) says their 
researchers observed what many sex workers had reported, that in many cases 
the brothel receptionist, manager or licensee negotiates an overall fee for the 
room rental and extra services before the sex worker even meets the client. 
SSP AN (2006: 2-3) says that, despite stressing the independent status of their 
workers, brothel owners and managers impose a wide range of controls on 
88 This also means applying for an Australian Business Number (ABN) and conforming to the accounting 
requirements of tax law in this area. 
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workers including "the hours they can work, what they can wear to work and 
the prices they may charge for their services" . Workers "cannot even always 
decide to whom they choose to provide sexual services" and workers who refuse 
to see particular clients or who "commit other forms of 'misbehaviour' in the 
brothel owners' eyes are subject to sanctions" .  Sanctions take the form of being 
given quiet shifts with fewer opportunities to earn money and even being 
removed from the roster all together (which is effectively a dismissal without 
notice) . Brothels owners will threaten expulsion if workers decide to work shifts 
at another licensed brothel or if they conduct (legal) private work outside the 
brothel (SSPAN 2006:3) . 
As Murray (2003 :18) has argued,89 it is "clear that women working in the legal 
sex industry are not supplying sexual services in their own right, on conditions 
and at prices they determine" . So they do not, in reality, have a sub-contractor 
relationship with brothel owners. However, the law has frequently accepted the 
assignment of a sub-contractor relationship and this has been used to deny sex 
workers access to basic employment entitlements. Murray (Murray 2003:19) 
argues that sex workers have also sometimes been deceived into believing that 
this is in their own best interest. They are told by employers that the advantages 
of a 'flexible' work environment (for example, the availability of part-time and 
casual work) are dependent on their acceptance of sub-contractor status and that 
employee status will result in a loss of earnings. Murray argues (2003:19) that sex 
industry operators have "actively exploited" sex worker fears in this area in 
order to inhibit the process of workplace reform and to limit the establishment of 
basic workplace rights and entitlements. As she maintains, a sub-contractor 
relationship is not the only way to achieve flexible work arrangements;90 
"employment relationships can accommodate flexibility" (Murray 2003) . 
However, as the CMC (2004:106) has recently commented, the high licensing fees 
for brothels make them 'different' from other businesses and thus, by 
implication, perhaps less able than other businesses to 'afford' adequate 
employee benefits. But this simply calls attention to the way that the new 
regulatory regime for prostitution embraces a set of priorities that preclude the 
establishment of basic employment rights for workers in brothels. 
89 Murray's (2003) arguments are made specifically in relation to legal brothel employment in Victoria.
However, it is clear that these are also directly applicable in the Queensland situation; both jurisdictions 
license brothel owners and operators in a similar way. 
90 This is also a point that the CMC should note. They have recently commented (2004: 1 06) the 'flexibility'
of being able to refuse to provide sexual services or to take time away from work when it is necessary for a 
sex worker' s  wellbeing ' is not consistent with the usual expectations of regular employment' .  This is 
clearly not true. All sorts of leave (most notably sick leave) are available for regular employees. Moreover, 
in Victoria, brothel workers are legally able to refuse to provide sexual services of any specific type and 
have the right to refuse particular clients. There are analogies for this in the general workforce for example, 
employed doctors and nurses are not required to perform or participate in the provision of abortion. 
36 
The licensing regime and new institutional framework established under the 
Queensland Prostitu tion Act of 1 999 clearly prioritises the elimination of 
organised crime from the prostitution industry. The CMC has recently claimed 
that this has been achieved in the legal brothel industry (CMC 2004:xii) . While 
this may have some benefits for sex workers, the costs borne by women working 
in the industry (and the benefits enjoyed by largely male licensees) are high. The 
long and expensive process for obtaining a brothel license is likely to be beyond 
the means of most sex workers. And, due to the historical criminalisation of their 
work, many older sex workers will have criminal records that preclude them 
from becoming licensees. So, under the present regime, it is unlikely that sex 
workers will be able to establish their own brothel business. Moreover, as the 
current licensing and regulatory regime is organised around the vetting of 
brothel owners and operators, it has little real capacity to pay attention to 
industrial issues for workers. This is a significant and ongoing problem for 
workers as another historical legacy of the illegal industry is that there are no 
established 'normal' working conditions (as exists, for example, in most other 
occupations in Australia) . As most workers in the prostitution industry are 
young, casual and non-unionised this means that brothel owners and managers 
are handed significant power to set in place working conditions that are 
problematic for brothel workers. 
This situation is compounded by the fact that sex workers have no direct voice in 
the new regulatory regime. Under the 1999 Act, a Prostitution Advisory Council 
was established that included a representative of sex workers in Queensland. 
However, this Council was formally dissolved in 2003 and many of its functions 
were transferred to the PLA. The Board of the PLA includes representatives of 
the police, the minister, lawyers and public health personnel; since 2003 it has 
also included two people who represent ' community interests' .  However, there is 
no representation of sex workers. 
Sex workers in licensed brothels are also subject to onerous and oppressive 
regimes of health examinations. Under sections 89 and 90 of the 1999 Act it is an 
offence for a prostitute to work while infected with a sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) or for a brothel owner/manager to permit a prostitute to work 
with an STD. Interestingly, it is not an offence to seek out the services of a sex 
worker (ie to be a client) if you have an STD; and it is also not apparently a 
serious problem if you give or receive sexual services while infected with non­
sexual bugs (for example, a cold or the flu) . A defence to charges under sections 
89 and 90 of the Prostitu tion Act is established if the worker has been regularly 
screened for STDs. In practice, brothels currently require workers to be tested 
every six weeks and if this is not performed the sex worker is not allowed to 
work. 
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Now the compulsory examination of prostitutes for STDs has a long and 
oppressive history in Queensland and in other jurisdictions (Sullivan 1997: 21-22; 
Evans 1984) . In late 19th century Britain one of the first avowedly feminist 
campaigns was waged against the Contagious Diseases acts which imposed 
compulsory medical examination on known prostitutes (but not, of course, their 
clients) and included the incarceration in ' lock hospitals' of sex workers found to 
be suffering from an STD. These sorts of laws achieved very little in terms of 
controlling the spread of STDs but clearly breached women's human rights and 
imposed a sexual double standard (because men were not liable) . They also led 
to a large number of women being named and marked (for life) by the state's 
labelling of them as 'prostitutes' . Queensland had its own contagious diseases 
acts and these were not repealed until 1971 . Until the mid-1940s, 'known 
prostitutes' (and perhaps just women seen as 'promiscuous') were regularly 
incarcerated in the Brisbane 'lock hospital' attached to the Boggo Road jail . 
Evidence to the Fitzgerald Inquiry in the mid 1980s suggests that even after this 
period, police were involved in 'rounding up' and escorting to the Health 
department sex workers who failed to attend STD screenings. 
In the present day, the testing of sex workers for STDs remains compulsory in 
legal brothels although, as the CMC has recently claimed, the process is now 
'indirect' (CMC 2004:59) . However, as Metzenrath has argued (1999:25) : 
any sort of compulsory testing of sex workers (is) both unreasonable and 
unjustified. Compulsory testing serves no purpose other than to 
stigmatise sex workers continually for the work they do and represents a 
denial of basic civil liberties. 
It is unreasonable and unjustified because all the literature agrees that Australian 
sex workers now have a very low incidence of STDs (Donovan and Harcourt 
1996; Harcourt, Egger and Donovan 2005) and may indeed enjoy better sexual 
health than the rest of the community (Metzenrath 1999:28) . This has largely been 
the result of very successful safe sex campaigns aimed at sex workers and based 
on peer education principles (Metzenrath 1999) although other factors, such as 
law reform, the public funding of sex worker advocacy groups and 
improvements in the quality and accessibility of sexual health services may also 
have been important (Donovan and Harcourt 1996:63) . Whatever the reasons, 
this Australia-wide trend demonstrates that sex workers are both willing and 
able to manage their own sexual health. The literature also suggests that there is 
no actual public health advantage associated with the compulsory testing of sex 
workers for STDs. For example, Harcourt et al (2005:125) have recently reported 
lower rates of gonorrhoea in sex workers in Sydney (where STD testing is not 
legally required) than in Victoria (where brothels are licensed and the same 
requirements are in force as in Queensland) . 
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So why are workers in legal brothels in Queensland subject to compulsory STD 
screening? According to the CMC (2004:58) this practise is in the interests of 
'ensuring a healthy society' although statements like this clearly cannot be 
scientifically justified especially as there is also a legal requirement in 
Queensland that commercial sex must always be conducted with a prophylactic 
in place. All the literature suggests that almost 100% of sexual transactions in 
legal brothels are conducted according to safe sex principles (ie the application of 
barrier methods for preventing the transmission of infection) . A similar level of 
safe sex practise is not even attempted in the rest of the population! It is, 
however, part of the 'common sense' of Queensland political culture that 
prostitutes need to be subjected to regular health testing. The laws in this regard 
are never questioned (except by sex worker advocates, often from interstate) and, 
indeed, are often used to re-assure the Queensland public when amendments to 
prostitution laws are being proposed and debated in the parliament. So 
politicians will use mandatory testing as a way of facilitating public support for 
measures designed to better 'govern' the prostitution industry. It is notable as 
well that there are no campaigns in Queensland (or the rest of Australia) for 
other workers regarded as vulnerable to infection, and to spreading infection, to 
be subjected to compulsory health testing. For example, surgeons, dentists, and 
nurses are not required to undertake any direct or indirect form of health 
screening (see Metzemath 1999:29) . In medical situations the rule is not to 
assume the absence of infection in any situation and to ensure barriers (such as 
sterilisation and protective equipment) are always in place. Medical workers will 
also, of course, have access to voluntary testing and treatment if required. So 
why are the same procedures not regarded as suitable for sex workers? The 
answer to this question would seem to lie in cultural understandings of what it 
means to be a prostitute and thus in the imposition of pathological stereotypes on 
women currently supporting themselves via sex work. Our culture regards 
prostitutes in two main ways - as sad victims or as 'bad' women who are wilfully 
promiscuous and thus a danger both to themselves and the community (see 
Sullivan 1997) . These sorts of punitive and misogynist stereotypes regularly 
compromise the safety of women working in prostitution and are probably one 
of the main reasons why the occupation of being a sex worker is so dangerous. 
Licensed, legal prostitution does not automatically wipe out these stereotypes. If 
the regulatory framework is not sensitive to their presence, and actively involved 
in undermining them, then we can expect they will continue to have significant 
and detrimental effects on the lives of sex workers. I would suggest one way 
these stereotypes are presently being re-created is via compulsory heath testing.91 
9 1 See also Loff et al (2003) for how health programs can lead to the mistreatment of sex workers in other
areas of the world. 
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The requirement on workers in licensed brothels - that they be screened for STDs 
every six weeks - is demeaning and discriminatory. 
Private workers in Queensland are not subject to the same disadvantages as 
brothel workers. They earn more than brothel workers (CMC 2004:83) - mainly 
because they retain the full fee paid by a client - and have more control over their 
working hours and conditions. They are also not subject to compulsory health 
testing. However, private workers are more vulnerable to violence mainly 
because they must work alone if they are not to be liable for arrest and 
prosecution. Like sex workers in licensed brothels, private workers - and their 
clients - are legally required to use a prophylactic in any commercial sex 
transaction. The advertising of their services is also subject to surveillance by the 
PLA. In the last few years, private workers have been a particular object of police 
and PLA activity. Scarlet Alliance (the national sex worker rights body) has 
recently commented on the "broad scale police harassment and criminal 
prosecutions of private workers" whose advertising did not exactly conform to 
(new) requirements established by the PLA; the prohibited advertisements 
contained the word 'services' . Consequently, some private workers were 
"dragged to the police station in their sex work lingerie and charged with a 
criminal offence" (Scarlet Alliance 2006 Submission to the CJC on the interim 
report on the provision of out-call services in Queensland) . This sort of action is 
clearly part of a broader campaign by the police and PLA to bring private 
workers more directly under state control . The overall aim of the law is to 
eliminate illegal prostitution and 'organised crime' . Illegal brothels and escort 
agencies - and private workers who do not work alone - are seen as prime 
targets in this campaign. Consequently a lot of current policing has been 
focussed on the entrapment of private workers by police(men) posing as clients 
and requesting two workers or requesting the provision of sexual services 
without a prophylactic. Workers who agree to either of these proposals are liable 
to arrest. The police and CMC claim that this sort of activity is necessary to 
combat ' organised crime' . However, it is notable that many of the cases that have 
come to court involve just two sex workers working together or a second person 
supporting and/ or protecting the safety of a worker. It is also worth 
remembering that, in the Queensland context, organised crime in the prostitution 
industry has been largely carried out by police. So any new regulatory regime -
and especially one that aims to combat organised crime - should be aiming to 
increase the separation between sex workers, sex businesses and the police. The 
current laws clearly allow for some separation (via the PLA) but a great of police 
involvement continues in relation to private workers (and also, amazingly, in 
relation to the operation of licensed brothels.92 It would appear that even the 
92 Sections 59-6 1 in the Prostitution A ct 1 999 allows police to enter a licensed brothel at any time it is open
for business. The CMC has recently reported that police do, in practise, visit licensed brothels (CMC 
2004 : 1 00) 
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stringent probity requirements of the licensing procedure are not sufficient to 
eliminate the claimed 'need' for police surveillance of legal brothels) . 
Historically, it is evident that tougher prostitution laws have provided the 
grounds of possibility for police corruption and organised crime associated with 
the prostitution industry (Allen 1984) . But this is rarely considered in the 
Queensland context. 
A proposal to amend the Prostitution Act presently before the Queensland 
parliament, will clearly increase police powers over private workers. The bill 
proposes a raft of relatively unproblematic reforms designed to stream-line and 
improve the system of legal/ licensed brothels. However, it also includes 
measures designed to increase the PLAs power over advertising by private 
workers (basically requiring them to 'register' with the PLA) and to outlaw the 
'offer' of commercial sex without a prophylactic. As indicated above, the practise 
of actually providing commercial sex without a prophylactic is already illegal; 
penalising the 'offer' is clearly likely to be popular with Queensland politicians 
and the Queensland public (for the cultural reasons discussed above) . However, 
it is obviously a measure designed to increase police powers in relation to private 
workers; police can ring private workers who advertise publicly and attempt to 
obtain compliance with a request for the provision of commercial sexual services 
without a prophylactic. While police are exempt from arrest in this area, private 
workers will not be so fortunate.93 
The final group of Queensland sex workers that I want to briefly address in this 
paper are street workers. It is widely acknowledged in the literature that street 
workers are more disadvantaged, more likely to be drug addicted, and more 
vulnerable to violence than any other group of sex workers. In Brisbane at least 
three street workers have been murdered in recent years. The new regulatory 
regime for prostitution has not really addressed this issue, except by further 
increasing the penalties associated with public soliciting for the purposes of 
prostitution - a measure which is designed to deter all street work and 
encourage legal employment in the sex industry. The CMC (2004: 81) has 
recently reported that the incidence of street prostitution has been 'significantly 
impacted' by high levels of prosecution, 'current policing strategies' (which are 
said to target male clients but to support workers to leave the industry) and by 
the use of new 'move-on' powers designed generally to address people causing a 
public nuisance. This level of police activity is partly evident in annual crime 
statistics released by the Queensland police service (cited in CMC 2004: 79); it is 
notable that arrests for public soliciting doubled between 2001/ 2  and 2002/3 and 
93 And a sex worker may reasonably decide, on good scientific grounds, that for example the provision of
oral sex without a prophylactic is not a huge risk to their health. My point here is simply that penalizing the 
offer to provide commercial sex without a prophylactic is both unnecessary (it has not been introduced in 
other Australian j urisdictions) and may undermine the relative autonomy of sex workers. 
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are now almost four times higher than before the introduction of the 1999 
Prostitu tion Act. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of a new regulatory regime for prostitution has delivered some 
advantages to some women working in the sex industry in Queensland. Before 
the 1999 Act, sex workers could only work legally as private workers and many 
complained about the daily dangers inherent in working alone. As a result of the 
1999 Act, the space for legal sex work opened slightly; workers could now also 
choose to operate from legal/ licensed brothels. However, as indicated above, 
there remain significant problems with employment in legal brothels; working 
conditions are poor and prostitutes are subject to unnecessary and intrusive 
health screenings. Private workers retain more autonomy but - as they are still 
required to work on their own - continue to be vulnerable to violence. Private 
workers are also a major target for new police and PLA strategies designed to 
eliminate illegal prostitution. Street workers remain extremely vulnerable to 
violence, arrest and very hefty fines.  In general, then it cannot be claimed that the 
new regulatory regime has delivered any major advantages to women working 
in the sex industry. 
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Burma 
Holly Kluver 
Holly Kluver is a final year Arts/Law student at the University of Queensland. Holly majored in 
International Relations and Asian Studies in her Arts degree and has been interested in the 
history of Burma and the life of Aung San Suu Kyi since beginning her studies in 200 1 .  Holly 
believes Aung San Suu Kyi is the embodiment of the "Women of Peace" theme for this year's 
Pandora's Box journal. 
Holly has been offered a position with Attorney-General's Department Graduate Program in 
Canberra in 2007. She would like to be involved with developing policies regarding national 
security in accordance with human rights policies. In the future, Holly hopes to travel to Burma 
and be involved in rebuilding a democratic Burma through the development of legal policy. 
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) is a powerful political figure and an advocate for a 
democratic Burma. She is leading the campaign for democracy and human rights 
and seeking to uproot the military junta which has illegitimately held power 
since the 1990 elections94. ASSK's democratic beliefs offer the Burmese people an 
alternative to the oppressive and tyrannical military rule. Burma has a troubled 
political history from British occupation to the nationalist movement for 
independence. After liberation from the British, Burma was democratically 
governed for only a short time before a military coup instilled a harsh and 
autocratic regime with no tolerance for dissidents. The military junta still 
violently suppresses anti-government actions and continues to disregard human 
rights. Despite the lack of claim to power, the junta retains its grasp over the 
country and permeates into all aspects of society. ASSK continually resists these 
acts of oppression and represents the ideals for a democratic Burma. Whilst she is 
not without fault and it is arguable her methods of non-engagement have left the 
political situation of Burma in a protracted crisis, she has greatly contributed to 
the people of Burma and her actions deserve merit and respect. 
Prior to WWII, Burma was a British colony. After losing the first and second 
Anglo-Burmese wars, Burma ceded territory to the British and was formally 
annexed to Britain in 188695. From 1942, the Japanese occupied Burma and 
94 Nick Knight, Understanding Australia's Neighbours: An Introduction to East & Southeast Asia', 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.175. 
95 See Appendix One 
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resisted British control with the assistance of the Thirty Comrades, the Japanese­
trained but Burmese-lead resistance group. In 1944, Aung San and his fellow 
Thirty Comrades established the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) 
and resisted both Japanese and British control and fought for independence96. 
With the Japanese defeated in WWII, the British reasserted their control over 
Burma but the AFPFL continued to resist foreign occupation and Burma gained 
independence in 194897. The leader of this resistance movement, Aung San, the 
father of ASSK, was assassinated in 1947 and is considered Burma's national hero 
for liberating the country from British rule98. 
In the period from 1948-62, Burma was democratically governed. The political 
situation drastically changed in 1962 when a military coup lead by General Ne 
Win seized power and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
ruled Burma99. The SLORC renamed the country Myanmar and imposed a harsh 
regime based on martial law curtailing freedoms for civil societyrno. 
In 1988, the democracy movement emerged lead by charismatic figure, ASSK101 .  
In  that same year, thousands of people in Rangoon rebelled against military rule 
in a non-violent pro-democracy demonstration. The military showed no 
tolerance for this dissent and bloodily suppressed demonstrators resulting in 
thousands of people killed or injured102. 
In 1990, the SLORC allowed elections to take place in Burma. The opposition 
party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) lead by ASSK won by a 
landslide securing over 80% of the seats103. The SLORC did not expect these 
results and refused to allow parliament to convene. Despite the lack of 
legitimate claim to power, the SLORC refused to recognise the results of the 
election and placed ASSK under house arrest and imprisoned many NLD party 
members. 
ASSK was placed under house arrest by the military and spent six years in 
isolation. During this time of house arrest, or 'protective custody' as deemed by 
the military, ASSK was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize104. This award gave 
96 Aat Vervoorn, Re-orient: Change in Asian Societies, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp.4-5. 
97 "History of Southeast Asia: Myanmar", ASEAN Focus Group,
(http:/ /www.aseanfocus.com/publications/history_myanmar.html). 
98 Ibid .  
99 Colin Mackerras (ed), Eastern Asia: An Introductory History, (Frenchs Forest: Longman, 2000), 
p.253.
100 Vervoorn, Re-orien t: Change in Asian Societies, p.47. 
1 01 "Aung San Suu Kyi :  The Prisoner of Rangoon", Cutting Edge, SBS TV, 28 August 2003 
1 02 Knight, Understanding Australia's Neighbours: An Introduction to East & Sou theast Asia', p.175. 
1 03 Jbid. 
l04 Mackerras ( ed), Eastern Asia: An Introductory History, p.253. 
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international recognition to the efforts of ASSK in attempting to secure 
democracy in Burma. Furthermore, it is arguable this award has conferred some 
level of protection as although ASSK remains under house arrest, the military 
have not opted to eliminate their most threatening political opponentrns. 
ASSK has been in and out of house arrest since 1989 yet still has resounding 
support from the people of Burma as well on an international scale. Her 
principles for a democratic Burma, and the fact the military junta still refuses to 
acknowledge the results of the 1990 elections, have drawn the attention of the 
worldwide community. During ASSK's house arrest in 2003, the Dalai Llama, the 
US government and the EU all called for her release106. 
Since the regime has been in power, the military have largely ignored 
international criticism despite the imposition of severe sanctions107. The EU 
remains committed to sanctions and demands the release of pro-democracy 
leaders108. ASSK endorses the sanctions as foreign aid and investment does not 
reach the Burmese people rather maintains the current autocratic regime109. The 
EU sanctions110 noticeably include a travel ban which compliments ASSK' s anti­
tourism campaign which began in the mid-1990s. The military authorities held 
1996 as the year of tourism and opened Burma's doors to the worldlll .  
Consequently, thousands of peasants were forcibly removed from their homes 
virtually overnight and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates 
over three million people were forced into slave labour to build the infrastructure 
necessary to accommodate foreign tourists1 12. Revenue from tourism maintains 
the regime and now is not the right time for tourists to visit Burma. ASSK says, " I  
shall welcome tourists and investors when we are free113 . ' '  Whilst international 
efforts have used economic and political manoeuvres to destabilise the military 
10s Clare Murphy, "The Nobel: Dynamite or damp squib?", BBC News Online, 8 October 2004 
(http://news.bbc.co. uk/ go/ pr / fr/-/ 2/hi/ middle_ east/ 3724734.stm) 
1 06 "Aung San Suu Kyi :  The Prisoner of Rangoon", Cutting Edge, SBS TV, 28 August 2003 
1 07 Aung Zaw, "Military Maneuvers: Burma's leaders speak of democracy while ruthlessly 
suppressing it", Time International (Asia Edition), vol. 163, i23 Gune 2004) p.48 .  
1 0s European Information Service, "EU /Burma: EU And Asia Seek Progress On Human Rights", 
European Report, 2 April 2005, p.514. 
1 09 Victor, Barbara, The Lady: Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Laureate and Burma's Prisoner (Boston: 
Faber & Faber, 1998) p.220. 
1 1 0  European Information Service, "EU /Burma: EU And Asia Seek Progress On Human Rights", 
p.514.
111 "Aung San Suu Kyi :  The Prisoner of Rangoon", Cutting Edge, SBS TV, 28 August 2003 
112 "Aung San Suu Kyi :  The Prisoner of Rangoon", Cutting Edge, SBS TV, 28 August 2003 
1 13 John Pilger, "With an eye to its vast Asian market, Europe promotes human rights when the 
price is right. In Burma, crimes against humanity are allowed to continue without challenge", 
New Statesman, vol .134, i4724, (January 2005), p.18 
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regime, fifteen years of sanctions has no visible effect on the ability of the 
military to maintain power114. 
Burma has been a pariah state for many years, alienated from the international 
community, until securing membership to ASEAN in 1997115. This regional 
forum comprised of Asian states has traditionally avoided becoming involved in 
internal domestic disputes. However, the treatment of ASSK by the Burmese 
military has spurred a change in attitude from member states of ASEAN. In 2003, 
most unexpectedly, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad called for the 
release of ASSK and toyed with the concept of expelling Burma from ASEAN 
despite being instrumental in convincing the other members to ASEAN to accept 
Burma for membership116. An expulsion has significant political and economic 
ramifications and it is evident ASSK has a profound impact on other nation's 
leaders. The Malaysian parliament is set to pass a motion calling for her release 
and for the implementation of promised political reforms in Burma or face losing 
its chairmanship next year117• In April 2005, the EU again called for the release of 
ASSK before Burma takes on the role of rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in late 
2006118. It is quite clear ASSK has significant backing both from regional actors, 
ASEAN and the EU, as well as US support. ASSK' s democratic ideals permeate 
Burmese society and resonate beyond Burma's borders, evidenced by the high 
level of support for ASSK and continued calls for her release. 
ASSK may be considered Burma's most popular political figure however is she 
the destined leader of a democratic Burma? Or is she just a phenomenon who is 
inadequate to represent the 'true culture' of Burma? These questions will be 
answered considering the cultural history of Burma, the attributes ASSK has as a 
leader and the possibility of leadership within the current confines of military 
principles which preclude women, and more specifically ASSK, from becoming 
the leader of Burma. 
There are no real cultural impediments to a woman ruling Burma. Women 
experience a relatively equal position in the household and economy and have 
inheritance rights and the right of divorce119. Although in Buddhist terms, 
women are considered inferior there are still examples throughout Burmese 
1 14 European Information Service, "EU /Burma: EU And Asia Seek Progress On Human Rights", 
p.514.
1 1s Andrew Perrin, "A Purge in Burma: By sacking Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the junta 
abandons even the pretence of a more liberal future", Time International (Asia Edition), vol .164, i18 
(November 2004), p.39. 
1 16 Andrew Perrin, "Burma Feels The Heat", Time International, vol.162, i4 (August 2003), p.21 .
1 17 Ibid. 
1 18 European Information Service, "EU /Burma: EU And Asia Seek Progress On Human Rights", 
p.514.
1 19 Michael Aris(ed), Freedom from Fear: and other writings (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p.268 .
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history which demonstrate women have held positions of power. In the 15th 
century, Shin Saw Bu succeeded the throne in the Pegu Kingdom and in the 19th 
century, during the Konbaung dynasty, Queen Supayalat, queen of Burma's last 
king, exercised significant influence over her husband and was involved with 
state matters120. During the colonial period, women were active in politics 
although this role diminished in the 1947 election when only three women won 
seats and four women replaced the seats held by their assassinated husbands121 . 
In recent times, women have become revolutionary leaders in Asia; liberating 
their countries from tyrannical rule122. ASSK highlights her leadership of the 
democratic movement by using her father's name, Aung San. The name ' Aung 
San' personifies the concepts of struggle and liberation and has been elevated to 
heroic status. Being the daughter of a national hero certainly assists with 
recognition and leadership status. However, ASSK has contributed to Burma in 
her own right. The magnetic aura which draws and holds the attention of her 
supporters and an unwavering commitment to democracy are key components 
of a revolutionary leader. 
ASSK' s democratic principles and leadership ability may be attributed to the 
benefit of Western schooling and travelling widely. She was educated at Oxford 
University, travelled to New York to work for the United Nations, has lived in 
Bhutan and travelled around the world to countries such as the US, Japan and 
India123. A western education and experience in world affairs has enabled ASSK 
to critically comment on the harsh military rule in Burma and offer an alternative 
solution124. Her appreciation for the rule of law and human rights stems from her 
experiences in the West and she has incorporated these principles into her vision 
for Burma's future. 
It is arguable ASSK is not the most suited person to lead a democratic Burma. 
ASSK has spent a significant period of her life overseas as opposed to living in 
Burma. Her extensive travel experience means she has spent less time living in 
her own country experiencing life as the rest of the people of Burma subjected to 
military rule. In addition, Burma is a conglomerate of different ethnicities 
meaning it is nearly impossible for one person to adequately represent all of 
Burma. These are weak arguments which undermine ASSK' s ability to rule a 
democratic Burma. Due credit should be given to both her Western education 
and extensive travel as these experiences enabled her to criticise the military 
1 20 Ibid. 
1 2 1  Aris(ed), Freedom from Fear: and other writings, p.269. 
122 See Appendix Two 
1 23 Aris(ed), Freedom from Fear: and other writings, p.271 . 
1 24 Ibid. 
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regime and begin the non-violent resistance against autocratic rule. Furthermore, 
ethnic differences are not a hindrance to democracy. ASSK says, 
"The law treats everyone equally irrespective of who or what 
they are. If different groups are treated differently, this shows 
that law and order are absent125" . 
Considering this quote, ASSK has an appreciation for the rule of law which best 
operates in a democratic environment. ASSK has sacrificed her personal life and 
her freedom for the democratic cause and as a powerful orator and charismatic 
leader; she would be an ideal candidate to represent a democratic Burma. 
The military junta is one the world's longest lasting dictatorships and has proven 
to be very difficult to displace126. The military maintains this power by refusing 
to tolerate anti-government actions and ruthlessly exercises violence against any 
dissidents. In addition, the military has implemented draft principles to ensure it 
maintains a political stronghold127. These draft principles require the military to 
appoint the majority of the members of parliament and provides any future 
presidential candidate must have a record of active service in the armed forces12s. 
In effect, these draft principles prevent women from being presidential 
candidates as the Burmese military does not recruit women. Furthermore, a 
presidential candidate cannot be married to a foreigner nor have rights of 
citizenship to any other country129. This is directly targeted at ASSK and is an 
attempt by the military junta to prevent her becoming president of Burma. 
It is arguable ASSK is unable to exert any influence over the regime due to its 
unrelenting control over Burmese society . The military occupy the entirety of 
government positions, forcibly silence any pro-democracy actions and have 
manipulated the education system in their favour130. There is an intellectual­
drain as professionals have fled the country to seek better economic conditions 
and opportunities not available in Burma. The junta has the capacity to 
restructure and engineer society to ensure there is no alteration to the current 
power structure. However, the junta undermine the influence of civil society. The 
1990 election results indicate a mass following for the NLD and ASSK believes 
there is more solidarity now than ever before131 . ASSK explains change may not 
125 "Burma: Dealing with the Devil", Dateline, SBS TV, 11 February 2004. 
126 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, "Burma: a gentler authoritarianism? (The Day After)", Foreign
Policy, i139 (November/ December 2003), p.39. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Tate, Alison, "Cold August in Burma: Political action and political symbolism", Arena
Magazine, No.36 (August-September 1998), pp. 33 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, "Burma: a gentler authoritarianism? (The Day After)", p.39. 
131 "Aung San Suu Kyi: The Prisoner of Rangoon", Cutting Edge, SBS TV, 28 August 2003. 
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always be visible132 and continued commitment to the democratic cause may be 
causing hidden cracks in the political framework. 
The NLD, lead by ASSK, and the military authorities are in a political quagmire 
with neither party willing to negotiate. ASSK strongly maintains her principle of 
non-engagement with the military yet this policy may also be her greatest 
downfall. An unwillingness to negotiate locks all parties into a protracted 
stalemate with no chance of a successful outcome. ASSK has two options; either 
to maintain her attitude towards non-engagement or adopt the role of a practical 
politician and seek a compromise133. Other opposition groups, the various ethnic­
nationality parties, have opted to negotiate with the military rulers134. This 
approach is more realistic than a policy of non-engagement as change will only 
occur when parties communicate and negotiate. ASSK' s policy of non­
engagement has not resulted in a shift in the balance of power. Although 
international efforts135 have assisted in facilitating some dialogue between the 
NLD and the military authorities, without compromise, the political situation 
will remain unchanged. 
Another contentious issue between the NLD and the military junta is the drafting 
of Burma's new constitution136. In 2003, the newly appointed Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt137 announced the recommencement of the National 
Convention to draft a new constitution for Burma as part of the process towards 
democracy138. The NLD was one of the parties which was to be included in the 
drafting process although just a few days prior to the National Convention re­
opening, the NLD withdrew its involvement as the military authorities failed to 
assure the NLD genuine debate would be permitted139. Despite this being a 
132 Ibid.  
133 Amit Baruah, "Junta leaders, Suu Kyi in regular contact", The Hindu (New Delhi), 19 February 
2001 (http:/ / www .burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/ archives/200102/ msg00054.html). 
134 "Burma: Dealing with the Devil", Dateline, SBS TV, 11 February 2004. 
13s The U.N. Secretary-General 's special envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, assisted in the communication
process between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military junta. Baruah, "Junta leaders, Suu Kyi in 
regular contact" . 
136 Burma has had two previous constitutions, one prior to independence and the second in 1974 
under General Ne Win' s regime. "History of Southeast Asia: Myanmar" . 
137 PM General Khin Nyunt was sacked in late 2004 which was seen by the West as a setback to 
reform in Burma as Khin Nyunt was considered 'more pragmatic and less xenophobic than the 
country's paramount leader, General Than Shwe' . Perrin, "A Purge in Burma: By sacking Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt, the junta abandons even the pretence of a more liberal future", p.39. 
ns Zaw, "Military Maneuvers: Burma's leaders speak of democracy while ruthlessly suppressing
it", p.48 . 
139 Ashley South, "Political transition in Myanmar: a new model for democratization", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.26, i2 (August 2004), p.235. 
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legitimate concern, the NLD did not have an alternative plan once again leaving 
the situation at a political stalemate. 
ASSK' s campaign for democracy is a continuing battle spanning more than a 
decade. She has chosen to sacrifice her freedom and personal life to secure a 
better future for her country. As a revolutionary leader, ASSK emanates the 
leadership characteristics of her father in promoting the democratic cause. Her 
education and travel experience has enabled her to condemn the military junta 
and give the people of Burma an alternative to the harsh military rule. The 
junta's refusal to relinquish power is a distinctive obstacle and despite sixteen 
years since the 1990 election in which the NLD were victorious, ASSK has failed 
to uproot the military regime. The policy of non-engagement has not altered the 
status quo although her perseverance and determination has gained widespread 
international support and condemnation for the regime. ASSK is a magnetic 
public figure who has the ability to unite all people of Burma, regardless of 
ethnicity . She promotes a non-violent revolution in which the ideals of 
democracy will hopefully, one day, come to fruition. 
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Appendix Two 
Female leaders of revolutions in Asia 
Country Female Leader Male Martyr Relationship 
Bangladesh Begum Khaleda Zia Ziaur Rahman Widow 
(assassinated) 
Sheikh Hasina W ajed Sheikh Mujibur Daughter 
Rahman 
(assassinated) 
Burma Aung San Suu Kyi Aung San Daughter 
(assassinated) 
Indonesia Megawati Sukarno Daughter 
Sukarnopu tri (deposed by Suharto; 
died under house 
arrest) 
Malaysia Wan Azizah Wan Anwar Ibrahim Wife 
Ismail (imprisoned) 
Pakistan Benazir Bhutto Zutfikar All Bhutto Daughter 
(executed) 
Philippines Corazon C. Aquino Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. Widow 
(assassinated) 
All female leaders in this table are daughters, wives or widows of male 
martyrs141 . 
141 Mark R. Thompson, "Female leadership of democratic transitions in Asia", Pacific Affairs,
vol .75, no.4 (Winter 2002), pp. 535-558. 
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Appendix Three - Quotes by Aung San Suu Kyi 
Choices 
"My choice had always been made, you know, my country first. But I think 
people should not be made to choose between their private lives and their 
political beliefs142" . 
" I  don't look at this as a sacrifice. It's a choice. If you choose to do something 
then you shouldn't say it's a sacrifice. Because nobody forced you to do it143" . 
Power 
"My father said that people who claim that they have taken over power for 
love of their people and love of their country will earn no respect. They would 
gain some respect if they just said outright that it was for love of power144" .  
Beliefs 
" If ideas and beliefs are to be denied validity outside the geographical region 
and cultural boundaries of their origin, Buddhism would be confined to north 
India, Christianity to a narrow tract in the Middle East and Islam to 
Arabia 145" . 
Law 
"The law treats everyone equally irrespective of who or what they are. If 
different groups are treated differently, this shows that law and order are 
absent146" .  
Violence 
"The NLD will never take up arms. After all, if we take an overview 
of world history, we see that many military regimes have called it 
a day even if there was not already some form of armed resistance147" . 
"True strength doesn't need violence148" . 
Freedom 
"The struggle for democracy and human rights in Burma is a struggle for life 
and dignity. It is a struggle that encompasses our political, social and 
economic aspirations. The people of my country want the two freedoms that 
spell security: freedom from want and freedom from fear149" . 
142 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's pages (http:/ / www.dassk.org/ index.php). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's pages (http:/ / www .dassk.org/ index.php) . 
1 45 Aat Vervoorn, Re-orient: Change in Asian Societies, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p.56. 
146 "Burma: Dealing with the Devil", Dateline, SBS TV, 11 February 2004. 
147 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's pages (http:/ / www.dassk.org/ index.php) . 
148 "Burma: Dealing with the Devil", Dateline, SBS TV, 11 February 2004. 
149 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's pages (http:/ / www.dassk.org/ index.php) . 
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Around the world with a peaceful heart 
Louise Stevanovic 
Falun Gong (Falun Dafa) is an ancient exercise and meditation practice that was made public 
in China in 1 992 by the founder, Li Hongzhi. Falun Gong is similar, in some ways, to yoga 
and tai chi and has been widely promoted for its benefits to health and well-being. Falun Gong 
also emphasises the importance of ' cultivation' which means improving one's heart and mind 
by following the principles of 'Truthfulness, Compassion and Tolerance'. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially supported the practice. After seven years of 
unprecedented growth in China, and an estimated 100 million practitioners, the CCP grew 
nervous of Falun Gong's overwhelming popularity. China's former president and leader of the 
CCP, Jiang Zemin, decided to ban the practice in July 1 999 and personally initiated the 
suppression, which continues today. The CCP has politicised Falun Gong, but Jane Dai 
denies that the practice is political. "When people get involved in politics, they demand 
things," she says. "But we don't demand anything. All we want is to be able to practice Falun 
Gong in public parks and read Falun Gong books in our homes. These are the most basic 
human rights, and this is not getting involved in politics." 
Following is an account by Louise Stevanovic of Jane Dai' s experience as a Falun Gong 
practitioner and her fight to stop the persecution of Falun Gong. 
Little Fadu Chen has traveled to more countries in the six years of her life 
than most of us would hope to cover in our entirE lifetime. Fadu has 
accompanied her mother, Jane Dai, to forty-four countries around the world. 
However, they both wish they had not needed to made a single trip, because 
their purpose has not been a pleasant one. Each trip has been to tell the world 
what happened to Fadu' s father, Chengyong Chen. 
Chen was a Falun Gong practitioner, someone who tried to live each day 
according to the principles he believed in: truthfulness, compassion and 
tolerance. For this he was brutally tortured to death by the Chinese 
Communist Party and his body dumped in a field. 
Jane found out about her husband's death from a report on the Internet. She 
clearly remembers the day, July 26, 2001, two years after the Chinese 
Communist Party began a vicious crackdown on Falun Gong. "I went into 
shock and began to tremble uncontrollably as soon as I read the news", recalls 
Jane. "The pain was beyond description. I locked myself in my room and did 
not want to see anyone. My hair turned white overnight." 
After three months of grieving in private, Jane realised that she had to do 
something to restore justice. She wanted to go back to China to collect her 
husband's ashes and see that they were interred with appropriate honour and 
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dignity. When the Chinese Consulate General refused to give her a visa, Jane 
began a six-month campaign of petitioning politicians, contacting human 
rights organisations, and telling her story all around Australia to prompt the 
Australian government to act on her behalf. 
Jane's story 
Jane grew up in China and decided to move overseas after her university 
studies. She graduated with a degree in business economics and moved to 
Australia in 1987 to do further study. After the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen 
Square massacre, Chinese students were allowed to stay in Australia, so Jane 
stayed, and later became an Australian citizen. After ten years in Australia, 
she decided to travel around the world - not for pleasure, but to try and find a 
deeper meaning in life. She was searching for meaning and looking for 
answers. Her travels took her to Jerusalem, Canada and the United States, but 
her savings ran out before her search ended. 
In 1997 she decided to move back to Guangzhou - and it was here, back in her 
hometown, that her search finally ended. One day, while visiting a relative, 
she came across the book Zhuan Falun [the main text of Falun Gong] . " It took 
me three days to read the book", she remembers. "I was totally engrossed in it 
- everything I had been searching for was contained in this book." Jane recalls 
how she used to feel inferior because of her black hair and yellow skin, and 
because she was Chinese with an Australian passport. But after she read 
Zhuan Falun, for the first time she felt proud to be from China. 
Not long afterwards, Jane met Chen, who had also started practising Falun 
Gong, and they got married the same year. She was struck by Chen' s kindness 
and compassion, and referred to him as the ' love of my life' . 
Chen had started to practice Falun Gong after seeing the incredible affect it 
had on his father, Chaoneng. Chaoneng had uremia, and in the opinion of 
both western and eastern medical professionals, he was on death row. He had 
tried many types of qigong and paid numerous qigong masters to help him, 
but none of it made much difference. He was on the verge of giving up when 
a neighbour gave him a copy of Zhuan Falun. He read the book and started 
doing the exercises and living according to the principles of the practice. To 
his astonishment, his subsequent medical examinations showed that he was 
normal and healthy. 
Both Chen and Chaoneng worked in a government-owned paper mill with 
more than 10,000 employees (Guangzhou Paper Manufacturing Cooperation) . 
After Chaoneng's amazing recovery, many of the employees started to 
practice Falun Gong. "This is typical of how Falun Gong spread so rapidly in 
China", recalls Jane. " It was usually by word of mouth, based on the 
tremendous healing benefits" . 
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By 1999, the Chinese government estimated that there were 100 million Falun 
Gong practitioners in China, including many people in the Chinese 
government, Communist Party and the army. The knowledge that so many 
millions of people were involved in a spiritual practice that was not controlled 
by the Chinese government scared the then-leader of China, Jiang Zemin. He 
saw it as a personal threat, even though the practice was non-political, totally 
peaceful, and by all accounts, extremely beneficial for health and well-being. 
Jiang Zemin personally initiated the crackdown on Falun Gong in July 1999. 
Beginning of the crackdown 
The Chinese Communist Party started harassing Jane's husband in 1999, 
when the government-owned paper mill forced all employees to stop working 
for the entire day so that they could watch propaganda videos slandering 
Falun Gong. This was (and still is) a common tactic used to demonise the 
practice. "The government controls all the media in China", explained Jane. 
"We only heard propaganda on the radio, television and the newspapers, 
demonizing Falun Gong. After a while, many people began to believe it." 
In January 2000, Chen was arrested in Beijing after writing an appeal letter and 
was detained for 15 days. Jane was pregnant at the time and, as the horror 
stories of torture, mutilation, rape and forced abortion of Falun Gong 
practitioners began to surface, she decided to return to Australia by herself, 
fearful of the safety of her unborn child. Fadu was born in Sydney in April 2000 
and was only four months old when Jane heard that Chen had been arrested 
again. 
She returned to China with Fadu, anxious to do what she could to help Chen. 
Chen was released shortly after Jane arrived back in China. She later found out 
that her phone had been tapped and because Jane held an Australian passport 
and was considered a 'foreigner', the authorities had released her husband to 
avoid international attention. "He was forced to watch propaganda for 24 
hours a day, seven days a week and if he fell asleep they would beat him and 
pour water over him", Jane said. 
After his first arrest, Chen had been fired from his job. He had worked there for 
ten years, but the government policy towards Falun Gong practitioners - "ruin 
their reputations, bankrupt them financially and destroy them physically"1so -
meant that many hardworking employees were fired because of their spiritual 
beliefs. Chen left home to avoid further persecution, knowing that the Chinese 
authorities would often raid the homes of practitioners during the night, and 
arrest them. He was arrested again in Tiananmen Square in December 2000 and 
was tortured and electrocuted so badly that he was close to death. The 
authorities released him, expecting that he would die. He managed to make it 
1 50 Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, Part 5, 'On the Collusion of Jiang Zemin and the
Chinese Communist Party to Persecute Falun Gong' ,  published by The Epoch Times. 
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back to Guanzhou where Jane was staying. Four days later he was kidnapped 
again for the fourth time and Jane lost contact with him. 
Jane's visa expired after six months, so she had no choice but to return to 
Australia, still with no word from her husband. She was stopped at the airport 
in Guangzhou and her passport was confiscated, and returned just before she 
boarded the plane. By then Jane realised that she was on a blacklist and would 
probably never be able to return to China. "If Fa du and I hadn't held Australian 
passports, that would have been the end for both of us", she recalls. 
In July 2001, after months of concern for her husband, Jane saw his name in an 
internet news report: Chen' s decomposed body had been found in an 
abandoned hut in Guangzhou. 
Jane was in deep shock for three months, trying to come to terms with what 
had happened. She knew there was nothing she could do for Chen, but she 
realised she needed to do what she could to help others, who might otherwise 
have the same fate. 
In January 2002, after months of petitioning politicians, and raising awareness 
in every possible way, Jane was a guest on a popular radio talk show in 
Melbourne. The host promised that his team would be asking serious 
questions about the matter. Around the same time Jane contacted the 
Australian Consulate in Guangzhou directly. These two approaches 
eventually resulted in her husband's remains being brought to Australia in 
March 2002, and he was interred at a moving ceremony in Canberra. 
Although Chen had finally had a decent funeral, it was small consolation for 
Jane and Fadu. 
Crackdown destroys the family 
The family tragedies didn't end with the death of Chen. The Chinese 
authorities had asked Jane's sister-in-law (who is also a Falun Gong practitioner 
and had already been detained three times) to identify Chen's body when it 
was initially found. This was a trap - as soon as the sister-in-law arrived at the 
police station, she was arrested and sent to a labour camp, where she was 
tortured both physically and mentally until she renounced Falun Gong. "This 
was even worse than the death of my husband," said Jane, who couldn't sleep 
at night after she heard what happened to her sister-in-law. "Chen died with 
a clear conscience," she explained, "but although my sister-in-law is alive, her 
spirit has died. The spiritual death of a person is worse than their physical 
death." 
Chen' s father Chaoneng, whose health had improved so dramatically from 
practising Falun Gong, became sick from grief after Chen's death. At the 
beginning of the crackdown the Communist Party threatened that if he 
continued to practise Falun Gong, they would confiscate his house and 
withdraw his pension. He begged them to let him continue practising. " If I 
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can't practise, I will die", he told them. He died two months after Chen' s 
death, at the age of 68. 
Jane's brother has been constantly monitored and is still living in fear. His 
home was ransacked at the beginning of the persecution, and his Falun Gong 
books and material were confiscated. 
Jane knew she needed to continue to speak up. Her husband been murdered, 
her family torn apart, and many of her good friends in China had also been 
sent to labour camps because they practiced Falun Gong. Many of these 
friends had children, who were separated from their families and prevented 
from attending school or other educational facilities because of their parents' 
spiritual beliefs. " If I didn't speak up, who would?" she reflected. "They can 
torture, beat and kill our families, but they cannot kill our belief." 
Trips and lawsuits 
Jane and Fadu's first trip overseas was in 2002, to the United Nations 
International Human Rights Conference in Geneva. Fadu was just two years 
old. After Geneva, Jane and Fadu continued travelling to every continent 
around the world urging people everywhere to help end the Chinese 
government's persecution of Falun Gong. While it is too late to help Chen, 
Jane believes that it is not too late to save the hundreds of thousands of other 
Falun Gong practitioners in China, who face a similar fate. The Chinese 
government's influence is far reaching around the world, and Falun Gong 
practitioners have been harassed and intimidated in many countries by 
Chinese agents or those acting on their behalf, including in Australia. 
In October 2002 Jane took a further courageous step to seek justice for Falun 
Gong. She agreed to be a plaintiff in a lawsuit against the former leader of 
China, Jiang Zemin, who was directly responsible for the persecution. Jiang 
Zemin was charged with genocide and torture. 
In 2003, Jane was a plaintiff in four more lawsuits against Jiang Zemin in 
Geneva, Belgium, Spain and Germany. The Belgium lawsuit was filed by 
renowned lawyer Georges-Hemi Beauthier (best known for his role in 
bringing charges against former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet) . This 
lawsuit was against Jiang Zemin and two of his senior aides. All were charged 
with genocide, torture and crimes against humanity.1s1 
1 5 1 For full details of lawsuits, see http ://www.flgjustice.org 
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"Jiang ' s horrific form of genocide is a terror that does not jus t  destroy life, but aims 
to destroy faith . . .  It is a terror that must be brought to justice. " 
-Georges-Henri Beauthier (Compassion, Vol V, Spring 2004) 
Illegal organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners 
In May this year, Jane spoke in Auschwitz, Poland, at a forum entitled "Never 
again: Appeal to the world" . The forum presented the latest and most 
disturbing allegations to date: widespread illegal organ harvesting from Falun 
Gong prisoners of conscience. 
In March this year, two witnesses (neither of whom were Falun Gong 
practitioners) reported that Chinese hospitals were selling and transplanting 
the organs of imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners for huge profits and then 
cremating the bodies to destroy the evidence. An independent report released 
to the Canadian government in July concluded that these allegations were 
true. The report was the result of two months voluntary investigation by 
Canadian former Member of Parliament David Kilgour (former director of 
Asia and Pacific division of Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry) and 
renowned Canadian human rights lawyer David Matas. 
The Chinese government has openly admitted they use the organs of executed 
prisoners, and the Canadian report quoted conversations with staff in several 
hospitals in China who admitted they use the organs of imprisoned Falun 
Gong practitioners. Mr Matas and Mr Kilgour conducted interviews with 
witnesses in several countries, including Australia, and investigated 
government records and other evidence. They concluded that about 41,500 
transplants in China could not be accounted for by donors or executed 
prisoners. They concluded that these transplants came from the bodies of 
Falun Gong practitioners, thousands of whom are being held in labour camps 
and detention centres across China. 
The report states: "We believe that there has been, and continues today, to be 
large scale organ seizures from unwilling Falun Gong practitioners. We have 
concluded that the government of China and its agencies in numerous parts 
of the country, in particular hospitals but also detention centres and "people's 
courts", since 1999 have put to death a large but unknown number of Falun 
Gong prisoners of conscience. Their vital organs, including hearts, kidneys, 
livers and corneas, were virtually simultaneously sized involuntarily for sale 
at high prices, sometimes to foreigners, who normally face long waits for 
voluntary donations of such organs in their home countries."1s2 Mr Matas 
1 52 Report into a/legations of organ harvesting of Falung Gong practitioners in China, David Matas 
and David Kilgour, 6 July 2006. The report can be downloaded from 
http ://investigation. go. sa veinter .net/ 
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concluded, "Our findings are shocking. To us, this is a form of evil we have 
yet to see on this planet."153 
Jane said that choosing Auschwitz to expose this issue further was very 
significant. " In 1943 when one of the victims of Auschwitz escaped and told 
the western world his story, he was told that more evidence was needed 
before people would believe him" she said. "So many people died in 
Germany and Poland, while the western world waited for that evidence. I 
hope history doesn't repeat itself. At the end of a transplant operation, the 
hospital room is totally cleaned. The body of the 'donor' is cremated. What 
evidence are people waiting for? We have to act now to stop this continuing, 
we cannot just wait for evidence. I hope that everyone will ask themselves: 
'What can I do to help the situation?' When the page of history is turned, our 
grand children will ask us: ' In the face of such inhumanity, what did you 
do?"' 
At the end of August Jane travelled to Melbourne and Brisbane to join David 
Kilgour and Edward McMillan-Scott, vice president of the European Union. 
Mr Kilgour and Mr McMillan Scott visited Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and 
Brisbane to speak to parliamentarians, lawyers and doctors to call for an 
international investigation to stop the illegal organ harvesting in China. The 
Chinese Consul in Melbourne sent an email to MPs asking them not to attend 
the Melbourne forum. 
"When I reflect on my husband's death, I ask myself why he didn 't give up his belief 
in Falun Gong even at  the very end. It is because the principles of Truthfulness, 
Compassion and Forbearance are rooted in our hearts and no external force can take 
them away. Although my husband has passed away, my daughter and I will continue 
travelling around the world telling all people that the principles of Truthfulness, 
Compassion and Forbearance cannot be destroyed. When we look back through 
history, we can see that Christianity was persecu ted for 300 years, bu t it remains to 
this day. History shows that people's beliefs cannot be destroyed. " -Jane Dai. 
1 53 Spoken at a press conference in Canada on July 6 when the report was released. Quoted in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, China kills for organs, says report, July 8, 2006 
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Endless Flight 
Melody Kemp 
Melody Kemp, a member of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF), has lived and worked in Asia for almost 20 years, during which time she has 
worked on labour and women ' s  rights issues. Melody currently lives in Vientiane where she 
is working on the labour struggles in Burma and trying to find funds to update her book on 
women and workplace health. She says about her time in Burma, "These people are so 
dignified, brave and concerned for each other. It's humbling to be here." 
In 2005 women from more than 150 countries were nominated for a people's 
Nobel Prize. Among the nominations were Dr Cynthia Maung the Karen 
doctor who works on the Thai Burma border; Naw Zipporah Sein of the 
Karen Women's Organisation; Naw Paw Lu Lu who runs a safe house for 
Burmese refugees in Kanchanaburi Province in Thailand; and Charm Tong 
from the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) . 
That so many Burmese women were nominated is indicative of the swirl of 
conflict and horrors that have engulfed Burmese women for the past 60 years . 
For the Shan and Karen, the war which has attempted to maintain hold on 
traditional lands and lives has exacted a huge toll. Many brave women are 
active combatants, fighting in thick jungles rife with malaria and dengue, and 
of course facing the daily, hourly threat to their lives. 
For the past two weeks I have been in Thailand working with ethnic Burmans 
in Bangkok, and now am about to leave Chiang Mai where I have worked 
with Shan refugees. Shan women toil in the hot sun below me in the hotel 
court yard breaking up concrete so that foreign guests like me can swim in a 
renovated pool. It is the hot season and the temperature out there must be 40 
Celsius, and yet they are happy as they earn 100 Baht per day (AUD3.50) 
They told us that unlike other jobs, here they get paid on time. (Note that the 
official minimum wage in Thailand is BHT181 per day) . The Shan men earn 
BHT150. While motorcycling around Chiang Mai, one sees muffled women 
carrying bricks, bags of cement, or hammering at concrete guttering in the 
heat of the day. Such is the life of a refugee or migrant worker. 
Last week the Thai newspapers reported that the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) (the military junta that rules Burma) had 
commenced its dry season offensive deep into Karen and Shan lands, forcing 
up to 200,000 more refugees over the border and adding to the 1 .4 million 
Displaced Persons already in Thailand. There were reports of atrocities and 
torture of women and children. Women had been set on fire, stakes driven 
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into their vaginas, children skewered on bayonets. Crops ready to be 
harvested have been burned and looted and livestock killed and burned, so 
starvation is widespread. Now it is likely that the National Party for 
Democracy (NPD) of Aung San Suu K yi will be outlawed as the SDPC, having 
learned well from the West, is labeling it an 'above ground terrorist 
organisation' . Yesterday's reports indicate that many party members have 
been forced to resign. The Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) 
intervention has failed miserably, and most Western voices, including that of 
Alexander Downer, have been pathetically inadequate in the face of such 
brutal and on-going violence. While in Australia, I realised that the press are 
largely ignoring Burma in favour of football stories or the like. It is one of our 
own region's most gruesome and long standing conflicts and now it is likely 
that Aug San Suu K yi herself may be at risk. 
With some financial support from the Medical Association for Prevention of 
War (MAPW) I was able to send antibiotics to Dr Cynthia's clinic early this 
week, to treat the thousands who pour over the bridge into Mae Sot, with 
amputations caused by land mines, burns and bullet wounds, as well as 
malaria, post abortion infections, and starvation. The AUD 400 I received 
bought a decent pile (50 packets) of an expensive variety of antibiotic. By the 
time some patients are brought in by the brave paramedics who risk cross 
border patrols to collect those who have fallen victims to the daily battles, 
most are in a grave condition. 
SW AN have reported the systematic use of sexual violence against women. 
Over the past three years SW AN have documented the rape of women, many 
of whom are under 18 years of age.  Of those they have interviewed, 65% were 
pack raped, 58 % by officers, and 26 % were detailed for concubinage. The 
survivors reported that friends and neighbours had been killed or tortured 
after rape and died as a consequence. 
Last year SW AN launched a report called Catwalk to the Barracks which 
exposed the official conscription of women into sexual servitude to the 
Burmese Army. It goes on to document numerous types of abuse against 
Burmese women, even after ceasefires have been agreed. Its cover shows girls 
who have been forced to 'model' on a bizarre catwalk parade for the Burmese 
army. Even the daughters of SDPC officials are not safe from the licence to 
rape given to the Burmese army. The 11 year old daughter of an official was 
raped and murdered by a passing patrol. 
One of the participants in my training course this week told me of clusters of 
20 separate birth deformities in groups of Shan women that had found their 
way to the crisis center in Chiang Mai. That type of cluster is associated with 
chemical warfare or the intensive use of pesticides which are often dumped 
by chemical companies after their products are outlawed in the North. 
However to think that this cluster of defects was caused by agricultural 
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chemicals assumes that the farmers are rich enough to buy such goods and 
that agriculture is settled, none of which applies to Shan or Karen. 
A few months ago, on the way to Australia, I read a report in the Thai news 
announcing that the SDPC was establishing a series of dams on the Salween 
River in order to sell hydro power to Thailand. In the same report, the Thai 
state electricity authority (which was saved from privatisation by massive 
public anger) emphatically denied that it needed additional power, asserting 
that it had more than it needed. The Salween river flows through Karen 
heartlands, and the damming of its waters would rob the Karen of their 
traditional lands and push more over the border. No international outcry 
greeted the announcement, despite government motives being clear. The 
SDPC have ruthlessly logged the forests in the Karen and Shan states so that 
land degradation is dire. In this part of the world, most women are farmers, 
so the impact on women is one that should be of concern to both women's 
and environmental organisations. 
In the midst of all of this, refugee women are trying to educate their children 
and maintain some form of normalcy. 
For those in the refugee camps, life is miserable. They are not allowed out of 
the camps to seek work; they have no access to telephones or other ways of 
contacting family back in Burma. On leaving, life is tenuous and hard. Most of 
those I worked with had not seen their families for many years. My colleague 
from the Seafarers Union of Burma has not seen his wife and children since 
1994. H fears that contacting them would put their lives in danger as the 
paranoid government of Burma has spies and wire taps monitoring the 
families of dissidents. One young Shan worker's parents had died before he 
could see them, and he was unable to return to his village to perform the rites 
and ceremonies that would guarantee the peaceful transition of their souls. 
All of this reminds me of earlier times. I remember being in Perth during the 
Balkan war. The generous concerned women in Perth were sending sanitary 
packages to Bosnian women who had been raped, being quite unaware that 
East Timorese women immediately to their north were suffering the same fate 
and had been for longer. Similarly it seems that Australian women know little 
of the horrible lives endured by the Burmese people despite the nation being 
part of our region. Many visit Chiang Mai to marvel at markets, relax and 
visit splendid and ancient Wats, unaware that their rooms are cleaned by 
refugee women, the gardens tended by disenfranchised and traumatised men. 
Tourists solicit sex from Shan men and women, who willingly surrender their 
bodies so they can remit money back to Burma . . .  and besides, starvation is 
worse. 
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Magistrates Work Experience Program 
Each year, W ATL offers their members the opportunity to participate in the 
Magistrates Work Experience Program. In 2006 the standard of applications 
was highly competitive with the following students being selected to 
participate in the Work Experience Program: 
• Neha Chhatbar
• Binny DeSaram
• Tristan Fitzgerald
• Breanna Hamilton
• Melanie Hyde
• Anna Kloeden
The participants spent one day a week for 10 weeks with a Magistrate 
assisting with administrative and research tasks and sitting in on court 
sessions. WA TL would like to thank the following Magistrates for offering 
their time, to support the Magistrates Work Experience Program in 2006: 
• Ms L.M. Bradford-Morgan
• Mr. A.G. Dean
• Judge M.P. Irwin
• Ms C. G. Roney
• Ms A. C. Thacker
• Ms B. F. Tynan
A requirement of the Work Experience Program is that participants submit an 
essay that focuses on an issue that arose as part of their experience. The 
Editors would like to thank Clare Cappa, from the University of Queensland 
Law School, for adjudicating the essays. On the following pages are the essays 
judged as the top three. 
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The Queensland Justice Sys tem and Domestic Violence: Time for 
something special ? 
Breanna Hamilton 
I have had glasses thrown at me. I have been kicked in the abdomen when I 
was visibly pregnant. I have been kicked off the bed and hit while lying on 
the floor . .  . !  have been whipped, kicked and thrown, picked up again and 
thrown down again. I have been punched and kicked in the head, chest, face 
and abdomen more times than I can count . .  . !  have suffered physical and 
emotional battering and spiritual rape . . .  Each night I dread the final blow that 
will kill me and leave my children motherless.154 
The preceding passage is a chilling account of the reality that many women 
face in their everyday lives. These women live in constant fear for their own 
lives and those of their children. This fear is so pervasive that many will never 
seek help - even in the face of life-threatening violence. They struggle to cope 
with these severe physical, emotional and spiritual injuries, whilst 
simultaneously acting to 'hide' them from the outside world . This has been 
the case for decades, perhaps even centuries, and to a large extent, this is still 
the case today. Although improvements have been made in the way our 
society reacts and responds to domestic violence, there are still large gaps that 
undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the system. The mechanisms 
currently in place for dealing with domestic violence in Queensland are only 
one, small fraction of what could, and should be done to solve this problem. 
This article will examine the development of the current system in 
Queensland and highlight its inherent weaknesses. It will then proceed to 
examine the possibility of establishing a specialist domestic violence court, 
and demonstrate how such a move could remedy many of these weaknesses. 
Finally, the feasibility of such a court being established will briefly be 
considered. 
The current system in Queensland 
Domestic violence was first recognised in Australia in the 1970s.155 The waves 
of feminist social reform that rolled through this decade had at their very core 
the notion of ' equality' - in the community, workplace, and home. The 'social, 
familial, financial and religious'156 ties that previously 'bound' women to their 
1 54 Del Martin, 'Battered Wives ' in Domestic Violence Law: A comprehensive overview of cases and 
sources. Nancy KD Lemon (ed) ( 1 996), 69. 
1 55 Colin James, (2006). 'Media, Men and Violence in Australian Divorce' 3 1  Alternative Law Journal 
6, 8.  
1 56 Ibid.
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husbands were relaxed. Wives were not penalised in the divorce courts for 
'walking out' on their husbands.157 I.t is thought that this liberalisation of 
family values played a part in the increase in domestic violence. Similarly, the 
'women's refuge movement' was created and surged into the 1980s. It is often 
credited as the 'impetus for contemporary domestic violence responses. '158 
Both federal and state governments came to acknowledge domestic violence 
as a real issue within the community. They provided funding for refuges and 
programs and began developing 'blueprints for action.'159 Following report 
findings, most states introduced civil actions as an option for future 
protection of victims.160 
In its infancy, Queensland's response to domestic violence largely paralleled 
that of the other Australian states. A report was commissioned in 1988, 
including 'substantial original research. ' 161 The Domestic Violence (Family 
Protection) Act 1989 was introduced as a result, and operated primarily to 
provide 'domestic violence protection orders' (DVOs) .162 This Act has since 
been heavily amended by the Domestic Violence Legislation Amendment Act 
2002 . 1 63 It extended the categories of people who are offered protection under 
the Act, bringing Queensland into line with the other states and territories .164 
It was intended that the Queensland Criminal Code 1899 support the above 
legislation. 
Problems with the system - policing, victim participation and social 
perceptions 
As can be seen, Queensland' s early response to domestic violence was 
satisfactory. The government's report contained innovative research, and civil 
protection orders were introduced within a similar time frame as the other 
states. This legislation has been helpful in the fight against domestic violence. 
However, it seems that Queensland began to fall behind, being one of the last 
states to extend the categories of people protected by DVOs, and it now seems 
that we are also struggling to keep up with combating other problems that are 
evident within our system. These problems include issues with police 
enforcement, victim participation and lingering social perceptions. 
1 57 Ibid. 
1 58 Dr Lesley Laing, (2000). ' Progress, trends and challenges in Australian responses to domestic 
violence' ( Issues Paper No 1 ,  Australian Domestic & Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2000), 2 .  
1 59 Ibid 3 .  
1 60 Heather Douglas and Lee Godden, (2003). ' Intimate Partner Violence: Transforming Harm into a 
Crime' 1 0  Murdoch University E-Law Journal, 2 .  
1 6 1  Ibid. 
1 62 Ibid.1 63 Renata Alexander. Domestic Violence in A ustralia. (2002), 1 25 .  
1 64  Sally Kift, (2002) .  ' More in  the family now' Proctor. May 20, 20. 
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The current system relies very heavily on police enforcement in order to be 
effective - 'often mistakenly', as noted by Stewart.165 Research conducted by 
the Crime and Misconduct Commission in 2005166 found that the 'problem of 
inadequate policing is indeed chronic and endemic .'167 It seems that many 
members of the police force still perceive 'domestics' to be a 'private' issue 
between spouses, and are generally reluctant to interfere. They view partner 
violence as beyond the reach of the law.168 Douglas and Godden provide 
some convincing evidence of this problem.169 It is the role of police officers to 
file applications for a DVO when there is sufficient evidence of domestic 
violence to meet the 'balance of probabilities' standard of proof.170 They also 
have an obligation to investigate where they reasonably suspect that a 
criminal act has occurred.171 Douglas and Godden found that in only 1 % of 
the files relating to applications for DVOs was an investigation ever 
conducted, and criminal charges were only laid in 0.4% of cases.172 These key 
players are failing to fulfill their duty of 'criminalising' domestic violence. 
Furthermore, police officers are generally the first people on the scene of a 
potential domestic dispute and therefore have a large amount of discretion as 
to whether and how the situation proceeds.173 Their conduct determines in a 
large part the victim's first impression of how the justice system will support 
her. They are an important subculture of the audience in the context of 
intimate partner violence.174 Somewhat disturbingly, attending officers will 
often ask the victim if they wish to make a formal complaint, whilst in the 
presence of the perpetrator.175 In this way, writers suggest that police are 
acting as 'filters', by expressly or implicitly discouraging victims from taking 
action.176 
Perhaps one of the most concerning dilemmas facing the system is lack of 
victim participation. As mentioned, improvements have been made to 
existing court facilities to make the victim feel more safe and comfortable.177 
However, in many ways this seems akin to a tokenistic gesture. Many victims 
1 65 Julie Stewart. 'Specialist Domestic/Family Violence courts within the Australian Context' (Issues 
Paper No 1 0, Australian Domestic & Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2005), 3 .  
1 66 Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland. 2005 . Report Summary: Policing Domestic 
Violence in Queensland. Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland, Brisbane. March: 1 -4 .  
1 67 Stewart, above n l 2, 3 .  
1 68 Douglas & Godden, above n7, 6.  
1 69 Ibid 2. 
1 70 Queensland Police Service Operational Procedures Manual, paragraph 9.6. 1 .  
1 7 1  Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) and Queensland Police Service Operational 
Procedures Manual, paragraph 9.3 . 1 ,  s7 1 Domestic Violence Act (Qld) . 
1 72 Douglas & Godden, above n7, 2. 
1 73 Carolyn Hoyle. Negotiating Domestic Violence: Police Criminal Justice and Victims (2000), 1 47 .  
1 74 William Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat. 'The Emergence and Transformation of  Disputes: 
Naming Blaming and Claiming' ( 1 980- 1 98 1 ) . 15 Law and Society Review 63 1 ,  644. 
1 75 Douglas & Godden, above n7, 8. 
1 76 Heather Douglas, (2003-2004). 'Crime in the Intimate Sphere : Prosecutions of Intimate Partner 
Violence' 7(2) Newcastle Law Review 79, 92. 
1 77 Judge Marshall Irwin, Chief Magistrate of Queensland, (2005) ' Response to Domestic and Family 
Violence: New Directions' Address to Domestic Violence Court Assistance Network Conference. 
Cairns, 1 1  November 2005 . 
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will not engage with the system to begin with, or withdraw their complaints 
prior to the court hearing. A basic lack of knowledge of the procedures 
involved will deter many.178 The Federal Government's Partnerships Against 
Domestic Violence179 found that, overall, women accessing the legal system 
after experiencing domestic violence found it to be 'complicated, intimidating, 
costly, difficult to access, time consuming and variable in its effectiveness' . It 
is disturbing that those who the system is designed to protect have the least 
faith in it, especially when the notion of empowerment is considered to be 
central to work with victims of domestic violence.ma A study in the United 
States listed public trust and confidence as a measure of court performance.181 
If this is correct, the performance of courts dealing with domestic violence 
leaves much to be desired. 
Although ground has been made in raising awareness of the issue of domestic 
violence, there are lingering social perceptions that label it as a 'private' issue 
that should be dealt with in the ' intimate sphere' . As Evans writes, 
'perspectives of domestic violence in the current Australian context are still 
too narrowly conceived.182 These views, inter alia, help to explain why groups 
still struggle to have assaults occasioned through domestic violence 
prosecuted as a 'crime' . As noted by Justice Gillen of the Supreme Court of 
Ireland, 'a failure to bring these perpetrators witrun the rule of the law not 
only serves to undermine public confidence in the justice system . . .  but 
perpetuates, in the eyes of the community, a parallel social norm which 
gathers legitimacy from the failure to question it' .183 
Specialist Domestic Violence Court - A potential solution 
One potential solution for the problems raised above is the establishment of a 
specialist domestic violence court. This option was suggested by the federal 
government's Partnerships Against Domestic Violence184 initiative and has 
been given credence in Queensland by Judge Marshall Irwin (Chief 
Magistrate, 2005) .185 As defined by Moore, "specialist court' is an apt 
1 78 Douglas & Godden, above n7, 4. 
1 79 Federal Government, Office for Women. Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Summary 
Findings from Phase 1 for Policy Makers, 3 .
1 80 Laing, above n5 , 9. 
1 8 1  National Center for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of  
Justice. ( 1 990). 'Trial Court Performance Standards with Commentary' Virginia: National Center for 
State Courts cited in Australian Law Reform Commission ( 1 998). 'The Model Judiciary - Fitting in 
with Modem Government' ,  speech delivered by the President of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission at the Third Asia-Pacific Courts Conference, Shanghai, 6-8 October 1 998, 5 .  
1 82 Susan Evans, (2005). 'Beyond gender: Class, poverty and domestic violence' 58(2) A ustralian 
Social Work. 36, 37 .  
1 83 Justice Gillen, Supreme Court of Northern Ireland, (2005), ' Domestic Violence - In What 
Direction? ' Paper presented to the 50th Anniversary Commonwealth Law Conference, London,
September 2005. 
1 84 Partnerships Against Domestic Violence, above n25 ,  7 .  
1 85 Judge Marshall Irwin, above n24. 
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description of a court with jurisdiction limited to hearing and determining 
matters in a confined area of the law or a limited field of human activity.'186 
These courts began to develop in the United States in the late 1980s in 
response to the perceived 'failure' of the traditional court system to deal with 
particular defendants .187 It has been posited that 'therapeutic jurisprudence' is 
the underlying approach adopted in these specialist courts.188 This means that 
normal procedural rules and the adversarial nature of the court are relaxed, 
with the focus being on 'rehabilitating' the participants, often through 
diversionary programs. They also decrease the time and cost that litigation in 
the normal courts usually entails. In an era when litigation is becoming more 
complex and time-consuming, specialist courts are becoming quite popular. 
Some commentators have even gone so far as to propose specialist courts for 
commercial matters, such as tax and competition law.189 There are now 
several hundred specialist domestic violence courts in the United States.190 
Various specialist domestic violence court models are established or are being 
trialed through pilot programs in Australia, in the ACT,191 South Australia,192 
Western Australia,193 Victoria194 and New South Wales.195 Note that 
Queensland is absent from this list, although there is one stand-alone project 
being run at the Gold Coast.196 Submissions have been made that the 
geographical ambit of this project be extended, to no avail . 
In order to function effectively, the features of a specialist domestic violence 
court will need to be carefully designed. The court should be implemented 
through legislation (similar to the Drug Court Act 2000), in order to provide 
formal foundations and stability. One critical point to be made is that the 
court must emphasize a victim-centered approach.197 The notion of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, though suitable in other specialist courts, is not 
applicable in domestic violence cases, as the perpetrator is not operating 
under an addiction or physical/ mental health problem. Though the court 
would be seeking to reform the perpetrator's behavior, this goal is secondary 
to that of restoring justice to the victim. In this sense, a 'hybrid approach' of 
1 86 Justice Michael Moore. 'The role of specialist courts - An Australian Perspective' (2000/200 1 )  
Lawasia Journal 1 3 9, 1 39 .1 87 Magistrate Hillary Hannam. ' Specialist Courts in the United States and their Relevance to 
Australian Justice' (2005) 1 7  Judicial Officers ' Bulletin 66, 66.1 88 Ibid; DB Rottman, 'Does effective therapeutic jurisprudence require specialized courts (and do 
specialized courts imply specialist judges)? ' (2002) 3 7 Court Review 22, 23 . 1 89 Robert Baxt, 'Do We Need Specialist Courts to Hear Commercial Matters and Company Law 
Matters in Particular? Or Will Any Division of the Federal Court Do? ' ( 1 997) 1 5  Companies and 
Securities Law Journal 1 22,  1 23 .1 90 Stewart, above n 1 2, 20. 
1 9 1  ACT Family Violence Intervention Program.1 92 Central Violence Intervention Program, Adelaide; Northern Violence Intervention Program, 
Elizabeth.1 93 Joondalup Family Violence Court; Geraldton Regional Domestic Violence Project. 
1 94 Family Violence Court pilots in Heidelberg and Ballarat.1 95 Domestic Violence Intervention Court Model pilots in Campbelltown and Wagga Wagga.1 96 Gold Coast Domestic Violence Integrated Response.
1 97 Stewart, above n 1 2, 34.  
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restorative and retributive justice is desirable.198 Hopefully, this will 
encourage a higher level of victim cooperation. A study conducted on a 
specialist domestic violence court in Canada found that cases are seven times 
more likely to proceed when victims 'co-operate'199, so this should be a 
primary goal in the handling of domestic violence cases. 
Another central feature is the high level of integration required between 
services. A fragmented approach will not be effective. Douglas and Hodden, 
citing Easteal note that 'the lack of a holistic, integrated response is a 
significant barrier to effective implementation of the criminal law.'200 Feminist 
and other community groups have fought hard to see the criminal law 
invoked against perpetrators on a consistent basis, and a specialist court may 
represent another step forward in this regard. In relation to the program 
currently operating in the ACT, Detective Superintendent Chris Lines states 
that 'the consistency of the group lies in its experience, commitment and 
fundamental acceptance of interagency cooperation. '201 Pilot programs in New 
South Wales also aim to 'increase collaboration between legal and welfare 
agencies.202 Magistrates, prosecutors, defence lawyers, court workers, the 
police force and community organisations will experience a greater sense of 
cohesion working within a specialist court, where all strive for best practice 
and each is accountable to the other.203 
Flowing on from this idea of integration is the possibility of making the 
domestic violence court a 'one-stop shop' for all domestic and family 
violence-related matters.204 Such matters would include applications for 
protection orders; breaches of such orders; bail applications and criminal 
offences involving domestic and family violence; associated criminal 
compensation applications and civil damages claims for personal injury 
arising from domestic and family violence.2os Calls have also been made to 
have specialist domestic violence courts deal with some family law matters, 
such as residence and contact orders. 206 The court would also be able to ref er 
perpetrators to intervention programs so that the underlying causes can be 
addressed, as opposed to just the outcomes.207 
1 98 Julie Stubbs. 'Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence and Family Violence' (Issues Paper No 9, 
Australian Domestic & Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2004), 1 8 . 
1 99 Myrna Dawson & Ronit Dinovitzer 'Victim Cooperation and the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
in a Specialized Court' (200 1 )  1 8(3) Justice Quarterly 593, 6 1 0-6 19 .  
200 Douglas and Rodden, above n7, 5 .  
201 Chris Lines. ' System Change in bite-sized chunks: Domestic Violence revisited in the ACT' (2003) 
78 Platypus Magazine 32,  33 .  
202 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 October 2004, p l  1 949 
(Premier Bob Carr). 
203 Stewart, above n l 2, 9 .  
204 Judge Marshall Irwin, above n24. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Stewart, above n l 2, 24 and 34. 
207 Judge Marshall Irwin, above n24. 
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Finally, perhaps one of the most important features of a specialist domestic 
violence court would be the specialist knowledge of its staff. This knowledge 
is cited by Stewart as one of the elements that 'makes a difference' in the 
domestic violence court. 20s All key personnel will undergo specific training, so 
they are in a better position to respond in a manner that will ensure the best 
outcome for the victim and the community. Magistrates or judges will preside 
exclusively, or at least part-time over domestic violence matters.209 Specialist 
victim advocates should also be provided, along with defendants' legal 
representatives who are 'sympathetic to the aims of the court.'210 'Accredited 
competency standards' and continual training should be utilized regularly in 
order to monitor staff performance.211 
A domestic violence court with the above-mentioned features would be better 
equipped to combat the many problems than a conventional magistrate's 
court. As noted by Stewart, there is 'commonality in the anticipated outcomes 
of specialist domestic violence courts, due largely to their victim focus.'212 
Increased victim participation, quality of service delivery and accountability 
of courts to the community are just some of the benefits proffered by specialist 
court advocates.213 Additionally, more proactive policing and therefore a 
higher level of safety for victims and their children are also anticipated.214 
Such a court can also achieve more consistency in orders, and has the time, 
resources and expertise to tailor an order to the case at hand. Most 
importantly, the establishment of a separate domestic violence court will raise 
the level of social awareness and have a deterrence effect - sending a clear 
message to present and potential perpetrators that such behavior will not be 
tolerated in Queensland. It also provides an opportunity for much-needed 
research on the area. 
However, specialist domestic violence courts do not come without their 
criticisms. Some feminist groups oppose such a development, as they believe 
it 'softens' the community's response.21s However, as stated, the criminal law 
would be applied in the specialist court, and applied more often that it is 
currently. And the focus will be on the victim - not on rehabilitating the 
perpetrator. Sir Laurence Street, a former Chief Justice of New South Wales 
has suggested that 'every time a new dispute situation is recognised there 
seems to be a tendency to create a specialist court to deal with it.'216 He warns 
against fragmentation within the justice system that may undermine the 
208 Stewart, above n l 2 , 8 .  
209 Ibid 9 .  
2 1 0  Ibid. 
2 1 1  Federal Government, Office for Women, above n25 ,  6 .  
2 1 2  Stewart, above n l 2, 8 .  
2 1 3  Ibid. 
2 1 4  Ibid. 
2 1 5  Stewart, above n l 2, 1 7 . 
2 1 6  'Proliferation and fragmentation in the Australian court system' ,  extract from an address by Sir 
Laurence Street at the 22°d Annual Industrial Relations Conference, ( 1 978) 52 A ustralian Law Journal 
594, 595. 
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utility of the system as a whole. However, the fact remains that there are some 
sensitive social problems that require special knowledge and processes to be 
solved successfully. Domestic violence is one such area. In this case, reform to 
the ordinary Magistrate's courts will not be sufficient. It is the act itself of 
establishing a separate domestic violence court that will bring with it the most 
benefits. Finally, overlapping of jurisdiction and duplication are cited as 
potential problems.217 Implementing the court through legislation would 
reduce the risk of jurisdictional conflict or duplication, and this can be 
amended as time proceeds. 
Resources required for the SDVC 
Although a specialist court has the potential to vastly improve the current 
domestic violence situation in Queensland, this inevitably comes at a price. 
Specialist courts are expensive to implement, monitor and sustain in the long 
term.218 Furthermore, as specialist courts are generally established in response 
to political or social problems, they are always 'vulnerable to abolition in the 
face of changing political or social values.'219 They are by no means a 
guaranteed investment. Some critics already argue that DVOs alone consume 
'thousands of man hours' per week and precious court time.220 However, one 
has to take into account the costs that could be saved as a result. Access 
Economics assessed the cost of domestic violence to Australia in 2002-2003 at 
$8.1 billion.221 This is a staggering number. In terms of economic impact, 
studies in the US have found that battered women spend twice as much time 
in bed as normal women, and have much higher health expenses, for both 
physical and mental illnesses.222 Domestic violence was also found to be one 
of the main causes of female alcoholism in that country.223 The cost of 
treatment for children who had witnessed domestic violence was also 
included.224 The cost to employers due to low employee productivity and 
high absenteeism and turnover was phenomenal.225 Finally, the costs of law 
enforcement are of course extremely high. Furthermore, because domestic 
violence is often cyclical, these are not one-off costs .  It is therefore easy to see 
how such a figure is reached.  If implemented effectively, a domestic violence 
court could potentially give a small boost to the economy in smaller 
2 1 7  Justice Michael Moore, above n33 ,  1 42 .  
2 1 8 Ibid 69; Stewart, above n 1 2, 1 7  and 1 8 . 
2 1 9  Justice Michael Moore 'The Role of Specialist Courts - An Australian Perspective' (2000-200 1 ) . 
LA WAS/A Journal 1 39, 1 4 1 .  
220 Trevor Nyman. 'Apprehended Violence: Industry or Disease? ' ( 1 999) Law Society Journal 52, 53 .  
2 2 1  Access Economics 'The Cost of Domestic Violence to the Australian Economy: Part 1 '  (2004) 
Partnerships Against Domestic Violence, ACT. 
222 Joan Zorza. ( 1 994). ' Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law' in 'Domestic Violence 
Law: A comprehensive overview of cases and sources' Nancy KD Lemon (ed) ( 1 996), 48. 
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communities, and Queensland overall. Furthermore, some funding could be 
expected from the federal government, as was provided in the ACT project. 
Conclusion 
This essay has examined the way in which the justice system in Queensland 
tackles the problem of domestic violence. The problems inherent in this 
system were reviewed, including issues with policing, victim cooperation and 
social perceptions. A specialist domestic violence court was proposed and 
some of the necessary features discussed. Finally, the expense involved in 
establishing such a court was briefly examined, and justified. Queensland has 
made progress in its fight against domestic violence in the last three decades. 
However, it now seems that we are falling behind in our response to this 
endemic social problem. It is time for the government to consider seriously 
the establishment of an innovative pilot program for a specialist domestic 
violence court. To use the words of Justice Gillen of the Supreme Court of 
Northern Ireland,226 ' . . .  if the rule of law is to be preserved and domestic 
violence effectively challenged, then we must recognise that no tradition is 
sacred, no convention indispensable and no precedent worth evaluation if it 
does not stand the test of the fundamentals of a civilised society generally 
expressed through the law' . 
226 Justice Gil len, above n30, 1 98 .  
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Envisaging An End To Violence 
Neha Chhatbar 
The disproportionately high rate of domestic violence within Indigenous 
communities in comparison with the non-Indigenous population is an issue of 
great concern. The Brisbane Murri Court, which is a sentencing court for 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, is potentially one effective means of 
addressing domestic violence in Indigenous communities. This is because the 
main objective of the Murri Court - which is to reduce the number of 
Indigenous people in prison - is likely to reduce the reoccurrence of domestic 
violence through facilitating the rehabilitation of offenders; reducing causes of 
domestic violence such as feelings of powerlessness and frustration amongst 
offenders, and by enhancing the authority of Elders. The latter allows the 
Indigenous concept of 'shaming' to take place and allows offenders to 
reconnect with their communities, both of which can discourage reoffending. 
Before examining the various ways in which the Murri Court can potentially 
reduce domestic violence within Indigenous communities, I will explain the 
nature of domestic violence affecting Indigenous communities. 
The term 'family violence' is generally preferred to 'domestic violence' by 
Indigenous communities, because it better signifies Indigenous perspectives 
and experiences of violence. For instance, the term connotes the trans­
generational pain of Indigenous people, where former victims of family 
violence later become perpetrators of violence. The term 'family violence' 
encompasses numerous types of violence in addition to what is commonly 
considered as domestic violence, such as rape, child abuse, homicide, suicide, 
self-injury, inter-group violence and one on one fighting between people of 
the same gender.227 Family violence which spans generations is known as 
cyclic violence.228 Family violence can be sexual, emotional, physical, 
economic or spiritual and occurs in the context of institutional violence (such 
as the former State policy of removing Indigenous children from their 
families) . 229 
I will use the term 'domestic violence' rather than family violence as I wish to 
refer specifically to violence by men against their wives and de facto partners. 
I will, however, explain that domestic violence in Indigenous communities is 
different from domestic violence as understood in non-Indigenous 
communities. As follows from an understanding of the term 'family 
violence', domestic violence in Indigenous communities occurs in the context 
of other forms of violence. In addition, violence experienced by women in 
Indigenous communities is not only gendered, but also racialised, as it occurs 
227 Paul Memmott, et al, Violence in Indigenous Communities: Full Report (200 1 )  1 -2 .  
228 Ibid., 2. 
229 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2003 
(2003) 1 57- 1 58;  Memmott, above n 1 ,  1 .  
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in the context of Indigenous experiences of historical and present racism. 230 
Another difference between domestic violence as experienced by Indigenous 
women compared with non-Indigenous women is a cultural one. An 
Indigenous woman identifies more strongly as a member of a wider kinship 
group or community, in comparison with the more Western perception of 
self-identity as an autonomous individual or member of a nuclear family.231 
This broader identification means that Indigenous women focus not only on 
their pain and suffering, but also seek a resolution to the pain and suffering of 
the men who perpetrate violence against them.232 
The rates of domestic violence are significantly higher among Indigenous 
peoples than for non-Indigenous Australians.233 A 2001 study in New South 
Wales reported that Indigenous females are 6.2 times more likely than non­
Indigenous people to be a victim of a domestic violence related assault.234 
Although Indigenous women want to see an end to domestic violence, they 
do not want their husbands and de facto partners to be imprisoned for such 
violence.235 This is because short-term imprisonment does not address the 
situational factors giving rise to domestic violence, such as alcohol abuse, a 
perception on the part of perpetrators that they have little control over their 
environment and a belief that violence is normal.236 In fact, imprisonment of 
their men often compounds the violence experienced by Indigenous 
women.237 
Imprisonment orders imposed in the Magistrates Court for domestic violence 
cases tend to be for less than one year. Such short-term imprisonment orders 
do not allow prisoners automatic access to rehabilitative courses, programs 
and counselling.238 Consequently, the circumstances giving rise to domestic 
violence are not addressed and the violence continues once the men are 
released from custody. The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody stated that prison "fails to facilitate the reintegration of offenders 
into their community and the society more generally."239 The Royal 
Commission also stated that "the evidence placed before this Commission 
indicates that the Aboriginal experience of imprisonment is itself . . .  directly 
230 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, above n 3, 1 58- 1 59.  
23 1 Ibid., 1 58 .  
232 Ibid. 
233 Memmott, above n 1 ,  6.  
2 3 4  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, above n 3 ,  222 . 
235 Annette Hennessy and Carolyn Willie, ' Sentencing Indigenous Offenders in Domestic and Family 
Violence Matters : A Queensland Experience' (Paper presented at The Australian and New Zealand 
Society of Criminology 2006 Conference, Hobart, 7-9 February 2006) 2. 
236 Memmott, above n 1 ,  1 0, 1 9-20. 
237 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, above n 3 ,  1 60.  
238 Annette Hennessy, ' Indigenous Sentencing Practices in Australia' (Paper presented at International 
Society for Reform of the Criminal Law Conference: Justice For All - Victims, Defendants, Prisoners 
and Community, Brisbane, July 2006) 1 0. 
239 Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission On Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Final Report 
( 1 99 1 )  vol 2, 25. 1 .3 .  
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related to the level of Aboriginal imprisonment,"240 as Indigenous men 
become institutionalized through their prison experiences and can 
consequently feel alienated from life outside prison.241 Additionally, 
imprisonment can enhance existing feelings of powerlessness and low self­
esteem amongst Indigenous men, as well as feelings of resentment and 
frustration against society, which in turn can lead to an expression of these 
negative emotions through violence against spouses and de facto partners. 242 
Men who have been imprisoned can also feel strongly jealous if their partner 
has commenced a new relationship in their absence. Jealousy in such a 
circumstance is not unusual when it is considered that relationships are one of 
the few commodities available to many Indigenous people. Sexual jealousy 
experienced by men returning from prison thus leads to an increase in 
violence perpetrated against women.243 For these numerous reasons, 
imprisonment is not a solution to domestic violence in Indigenous 
communities. Rather, imprisonment appears likely to increase cases of 
domestic violence. 
In light of its main objective of reducing Indigenous imprisonment rates, the 
Murri Court in Queensland promises to be one means of addressing the issue 
of domestic violence in Indigenous communities. This is because alternative 
sentences to imprisonment encourage the rehabilitation of offenders and thus 
a reduction in recidivism. Before I examine in detail the ability of the Murri 
Court to reduce domestic violence, I will briefly explain what the Murri Court 
is and how it is set up. 
The Murri Court is a recent innovation of the Brisbane Magistrates Court. It 
was opened on 6 August 2002 and this year received a South East Queensland 
NAIDOC Award for Excellence. Modeled on the Nunga Court in South 
Australia,244 it was established in order to address disproportionately high 
imprisonment rates for Indigenous people, which had been revealed in the 
1991 Royal Commission On Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.245 According to 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Indigenous adults are 15 times more likely 
to be incarcerated than non-Indigenous adults.246 
Offenders before the Brisbane Murri Court are Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander person who have pleaded guilty to an offence which falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court of Queensland and who have a reasonable 
likelihood of receiving a prison term for their offence/ s.247 Although I refer 
240 Ibid., 25 . 1 .2 .  
241 Ibid., 25 . 1 .2-25 . 1 .8 .  
242 Memmott, above n 1 ,  1 0, 1 3 . 
243 Ibid., 22. 
244 Elena Marchetti and Kathleen Daly, ' Indigenous Courts and Justice Practices in Australia' (2004) 
277 Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 2 .  
245 Ibid., 1 -2 .  
246 Ibid., 1 ;  Hennessy, above n 1 2, 1 .  
247 Queensland Courts, Magistrates Court Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 1 3  
<http ://www .courts.qld.gov .au/publications/annual/mag2002-2003 . pelf> at 2 1  July 2006. 
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solely to the Brisbane Murri Court, Murri Courts for adults are also held in 
Rockhampton, Mt Isa and Townsville, and a Murri Court sits in the Childrens 
Court in Brisbane, Caboolture, Townsville and Rockhampton.248 
The Murri Court provides a means of greater Indigenous involvement in the 
justice system, as was recommended by the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.249 Depending on the case, legal counsel for the 
defendant can very much take the back seat, with the Elders playing a 
significant and vital role in the Murri Court by providing information as to 
the background and circumstances of the off ender and there by assisting the 
Magistrate to deliver an appropriate sentence. Note, however, that the 
Magistrate alone makes the sentencing decision, in order to avoid reprisal 
against the Elders. 250 
As the Murri Court is intended to be less intimidating for defendants, it is 
more informal than mainstream courts. Court 32 in the Brisbane Magistrates 
Court complex was specially designed for the Murri Court. The artwork of 
Indigenous offenders is fixed to the walls. A long round table is in the center 
of the room. Instead of sitting behind the bench, the Magistrate sits besides 
the Elders at this table, across from the defendant, a relative of the defendant 
(if desired by the defendant) and the defence and police prosecution.251 The 
Magistrate does not robe and, along with the lawyers, uses plain English, 
rather than overly formal language which can appear foreign to Indigenous 
people. 252 These differences from mainstream courts are intended to ensure 
that Indigenous offenders before the court do not feel alienated by the court 
process.253 
Ensuring that the sentencing hearing is not alienating for Indigenous 
offenders in turn increases the likelihood that Indigenous offenders will 
appear at court when required to do so. As a failure to appear in court can 
lead to the issue of arrest warrants and imprisonment, increasing the rate of 
attendance reduces the likelihood of imprisonment for Indigenous persons.254 
Similar Indigenous courts in South Australia have been shown to be 
248 Department of Justice and Attorney General, The Murri Court (2006) 
<www.justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/C l l MurriCourt.pdf> at 20 July 2006. 
249 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Review of the Murri Court: Have Your Say (2005) 
<www.justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 20 July 2006. 
250 Department of Justice and Attorney General, The Murri Court (2006) 
<www .justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/C l l MurriCourt.pdf> at 20 July 2006; Hennessy, above n 12 ,  1 0. 
25 1 Department of Justice and Attorney General, The Murri Court (2006) 
<www .justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/C l l MurriCourt.pdf> at 20 July 2006. 
252 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Review of the Murri Court: Have Your Say (2005) 
<www.justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 20 July 2006; Commonwealth of 
Australia, Royal Commission On Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Final Report ( 1 99 1 )  vol 2, 22.4.2 1 .  
253 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Review of the Murri Court: Have Your Say (2005) 
<www .justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 20 July 2006 . 
254 Queensland Courts, Magistrates Court Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 1 2  
<http ://www.courts.qld.gov.au/publications/annual/mag2002-2003 .pdf> at 2 1  July 2006. 
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successful in substantially increasing the rate of court attendance.255 
Increasing the likelihood of court attendance is one method of achieving the 
Murri Court's main objective of reducing incarceration rates for Indigenous 
people. 
Another means by which the Murri Court reduces Indigenous imprisonment 
rates is by ordering alternative sentences to imprisonment wherever 
possible.256 The less formal environment and the presence and advice of the 
elders allows freer communication between the defendant and Magistrate, 
thus enhancing the Magistrate's understanding of the defendant's 
circumstances and thereby allowing the Magistrate to order a more 
appropriate sentence than imprisonment. Alternative sentences often include 
conditions such as attendance on the Elders and/ or Community Justice 
Groups and at drug, alcohol, psychological and violence treatment 
agencies.257 Such sentences are much more likely to reduce recidivism by 
addressing some of the multiple causes of domestic violence, such as alcohol 
abuse, low self esteem, a feeling of perceived powerlessness over the 
environment and a belief that domestic violence is normal.258 
Another aspect of the Murri Court which can discourage a reoccurrence of 
domestic violence is a reconnection of offenders with their communities. 
Reconnecting offenders to their communities enables social control to be 
exercised over offenders, as well as providing offenders with a support 
network which can discourage re-offending. The Murri Court facilitates the 
reconnection of offenders to their communities by providing opportunities for 
communication by offenders with Elders and Community Justice Groups in 
pre-trial sessions, during the court and - if it is a condition in the sentence -
after a court hearing through attendance on the Elders and/ or Community 
Justice Groups. 
Deterioration in social control - due to deliberate historical cultural 
dispossession - is one underlying cause of violence in Indigenous 
communities.259 Formalising the authority of Elders in Indigenous 
communities is an important means of ensuring that social control can be 
exercised over offenders. The Indigenous concept of 'shaming' is an 
emotionally powerful means of exercising this social control. The Murri 
Court can be effective in addressing domestic violence through the 
enhancement of respect for and the authority of Elders, which in turn 
facilitates the 'shaming' of offenders. According to Wright, "shaming is a 
very powerful process and holds the perpetrator accountable for the harm he 
or she has caused, as well as reinforcing traditional authority and 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Hennessy, above n 1 2, 1 0; Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Review of the Murri Court: 
Have Your Say (2005) <www .justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 20 July 2006. 
258 Memmott, above n 1 ,  1 0, 1 9-20. 
259 Memmott, above n 1 ,  12 .  
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encouraging respect for self, others and the community."260 Shaming is a way 
of bringing offenders to a realization of their wrongdoing and reduces the 
likelihood of a repetition of the offending behaviour. 
The process of 'shaming' is facilitated by the Murri Court. Magistrate Annette 
Hennessy has said that "What cannot be easily explained is the power of the 
Murri Court on a spiritual or emotional level."261 On one occasion that I 
observed the Murri Court, two female defendants were being heard one after 
the other for separate charges. The general feelings expressed by the Elders 
and the Magistrate were a combination of severe condemnation of the 
behaviour of defendants, yet also of support and encouragement for their 
future potential. 
During the observed hearing, one Elder in particular provided supportive and 
loving encouragement to the female defendants. I also noticed, however, that 
the Murri Court is certainly not a 'softer' option for Indigenous offenders, as 
is alleged by some.262 The female defendants were harshly reprimanded by 
both the Elders and the Magistrate for their behaviour and reminded of its 
consequences for themselves, their family, the Indigenous community and the 
wider non-Indigenous community. This censure and 'shaming' was so 
effective that one defendant was openly sobbing from shame and remorse. 
Similar Indigenous courts in New South Wales (known as Circle Sentencing 
Courts263) have been effective in dealing with domestic violence offenders 
through the practice of shaming.264 Shaming is thus another means by which 
the Murri Court is likely to be effective in reducing the reoccurrence of 
domestic violence. 
The Murri Court is a means of addressing domestic violence in Indigenous 
communities, as alternative sentences to imprisonment facilitate 
rehabilitation, while avoiding the negative consequences of imprisonment 
which can lead to further domestic violence. The Murri Court is also effective 
in addressing domestic violence in Indigenous communities because it allows 
Indigenous people a greater involvement in the justice system. The 
involvement of the Elders allows for the process of shaming to occur, which 
deters further re-offending. The involvement of the Indigenous community 
also allows for a reconnection of offenders with their communities, thereby 
providing Indigenous men with a support network. Although the Brisbane 
Murri Court is yet in its early years, it is hoped that in the long-term the court 
260 Helena Wright, 'Hand in Hand to a Safer Future: Indigenous Family Violence and Community 
Justice Groups' (2004) 26 Indigenous Law Bulletin, 1 7, 1 8 . 
261 Hennessy, above n 1 2, 1 0. 
262 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Review of the Murri Court: Have Your Say (2005) 
<www.justice.qld.gov.au/courts/pdfs/MurriCourtReview.pdf> at 20 July 2006. 
263 Marchetti and Daly, above n 1 8 , 3 .  
264 Australian Broadcasting Company, Inside the Circle (2005) 
<http ://www.abc.net.au/4comers/content/2005/s 14 76779 .htm> at 25 July 2006. 
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can proudly claim that it has had an effect in reducing domestic violence in 
Indigenous communities. 
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Alcohol: The Forgotten Drug that requires urgent treatment 
Tristan Fitzgerald 
In an era of unprecedented hope and prosperity, there is nothing more tragic 
than to see people destroy themselves from within. Many in society are 
aware of the devastating effect that drugs can have on individuals and the 
community at large. Strained family relationships, severe mental illness and 
the tragic loss of life due to drug overdoses are just a few chilling reminders 
of the destructive impact that drugs have on Australian society .  Arguably, 
however, of most concern to the wider community is the link between drugs 
and crime. Numerous studies have concluded that there is a strong 
association between illicit drugs and increased criminal activity.265 It is hardly 
surprising to note that some studies have claimed that up to 29% of crime is 
attributable to offenders' use of illicit drugs such as cannabis and 
marijuana.266 In order to combat the threat of drug-related crime, many 
community initiatives have been introduced. For example, specialist Drug 
Courts have been established to provide judicially supervised treatment for 
offenders with illicit drug addictions. Ironically, for all of society's efforts to 
reduce crime attributable to illicit drugs, it is a legal drug that may pose the 
greatest threat to law and order. 
For decades, politicians, law enforcement agencies and crime experts have 
failed to confront the increasing problem of alcohol-related crime. On too 
many occasions, considerable resources have been poured into the 'war on 
illegal drugs' at the expense of tackling alcohol abus� and its impact on 
criminal activity. This essay will argue that the facilities of Drug Court 
should be available for alcohol addicts as well as illicit drug addicts. As a 
starting point, it will be asserted that Drug Courts both in Australia and 
overseas have shown promising results in reducing drug-related crime. 
Secondly, evidence will be furnished to argue that alcohol is a contributing 
factor in at least as many crimes as illicit drugs. Lastly, it will be contended 
that Drug Court offers the services required to successfully treat alcohol 
addictions. In order to substantiate the argument that alcohol addictions 
should be encompassed within the scope of Drug Court, it must first be 
proven that Drug Courts are effective in dealing with individuals who are 
dependant on illicit drugs such as heroin, cannabis and marijuana. 
265 For e.g. ,  Pat Mayhew, Counting the Costs of Crime in A ustralia (2003) Australian Institute of 
Criminology <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi247t.html> at 27 July 2006; Urbis Keys 
Young, The Relationship between Drugs and Crime (2004) Australian Government Attorney-General 's  
Department 
<http://www.crimeprevention.gov .au/agd/WWW /ncphome.nsf/Page/R WPE6CE98989 l EFC 1 C3CA257 
06D002 1 855F> at 25 July 2006. 
266 Urbis Keys Young, The Relationship between Drugs and Crime (2004) Australian Government
Attorney-General' s  Department, 35  
<http://www.crimeprevention.gov.au/agd/WWW/ncphome.nsf/Page/RWPE6CE98989 1 EFC 1 C3CA257 
06D002 l 855F> at 25 July 2006. 
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Drug Court - courting a successful cure to drug addiction: 
Before outlining the successes and failures of Drug Courts, the concept and 
processes of Drug Court will be examined. In Queensland, Drug Courts were 
first established in 2000. The purpose of these institutions is to divert drug 
dependant offenders into intensive community-based treatment programs.267 
In order to be eligible for an Intensive Drug Rehabilitation Order (IDRO), 
offenders must plead guilty to their charges and must also satisfy the Court 
that their drug dependency contributed to the commission of their offences.268 
Those who are admitted to Drug Court participate in a range of rehabilitation 
and life skills programs aimed at addressing their drug dependency and 
preparing participants for re-integration into the community upon release. 
Throughout the course of the program, the offender's treatment is monitored 
by a Magistrate along with representatives from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the Department of Corrective Services, the Department of 
Health and Legal Aid. A distinctive aspect of the Drug Court is the 
Magistrate's ability to provide rewards to participants for good behaviour as 
well as retaining the power to sanction participants for non-compliance. Once 
a participant successfully completes Stage Three of their IDRO, the person is 
deemed to have graduated from the treatment program. On the other hand, if 
the participant's breaches of their IDRO are serious enough to indicate, on the 
balance of probabilities, that they have no reasonable prospects of 
successfully complying with the IDRO, the Magistrate may terminate the 
IDRO and sentence them to a term of imprisonment.269 The unique features 
of Drug Court have been credited with producing extremely promising 
results. 
In the years following the introduction of Drugs Courts both in Australia and 
overseas, the successes of these institutions have far outweighed any 
drawbacks associated with these judicially supervised treatment programs. 
Firstly, many studies assessing the effectiveness of Drug Courts have 
concluded that Drug Court graduates have significantly reduced rates of re­
offending compared with those who are released from prison or those who 
refuse to participate in Drug Court.270 One study into South East 
Queensland' s Drug Courts even suggests that some persons who do not even 
successfully complete their IDRO are less likely to re-offend than non-Drug 
Court participants.271 Secondly, the cost of treating a Drug Court participant 
is often much less than simply imprisoning an offender. For example, a cost­
benefit analysis conducted on New South Wales Drug Courts concluded that, 
267 Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 3 .  
268 Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 6 .  
269 Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 34. 
27° For e.g. , Toni Makkai and Keenan Veraar, Final Report on the South East Queensland Drug Court 
(2003) Australian Institute of Criminology, 40 <http://www.aic.gov .au/publications/tbp/tbp006.html> 
at 24 July 2006 . 
27 1  Ibid. 
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for each drug possession or drug use offence, over $19,000 was saved by 
processing offenders through Drug Court as opposed to imposing 
conventional sanctions.272 Lastly, the integration of services provided by the 
various government departments involved is extremely beneficial in 
preparing Drug Court participants for their unconditional release into the 
community. One of the greatest benefits of Drug Court is that it provides 
offenders with a range of life skills programs that address many of the issues 
underlying the offender's drug use.273 For example, offenders who have 
attained minimal educational qualifications are presented with the 
opportunity to complete TAFE courses in order to improve their employment 
prospects. Overall, these encouraging results would seem to support the 
view that drug treatment, rather than increased incarceration, is the most 
effective method of reducing both drug use and crime rates. 
However, despite these promising results, some academics have argued that 
the low graduation rate from Australian Drug Courts indicates the Court's 
inability to effectively treat offenders.274 In response to this criticism, one 
must accept that Australian Drug Courts have significant areas for 
improvement. For example, increased supervision and urine testing of 
participants during Phase One and more effective identification of individuals 
likely to succeed are some of the areas that need to be addressed in order to 
increase graduation rates. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Drug 
Courts in Australia are only in their infancy. It would be unrealistic to expect 
that attempts to rehabilitate chronic drug addicts with extensive criminal 
histories will produce instant results. By way of comparison, the 15-year old 
United States Drug Court system had to endure a similar period of 
experimentation and mixed results. However, retention rates in US Drug 
Courts presently average 68 % which is much higher than for most voluntary 
treatment clinics. 275 
Ultimately, it would be imprudent to ignore the numerous initial successes of 
Drug Court by focusing exclusively on deficiencies regarding the 
implementation of the Drug Court program. However, for all these 
encouraging successes, the clear benefits of Drug Court are not being fully 
utilised to treat alcohol addictions. 
Alcohol - Legally not a 'drug': 
272 Bronwyn Lind, Don Weatherburn, Shuling Chen, Marian Shanahan, Emily Lancsar, Marion Haas 
and Richard De Abreu Lourenco, New South Wales Drug Court Evaluation: Cost Effectiveness (2002) 
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 58 
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/2528 1 /20020605/www . lawlink.nsw.gov.au/L 1 5 .pdf> at 25 July 2006.
273 Tony Makkai and Jason Payne, 'Drug Courts: Current Issues and Future Prospects' (Paper presented 
at the I ih Annual Australian Winter School on Alcohol and Other Drugs, Brisbane, 9 July 2004).274 David Indermaur and Lynne Roberts, 'Drug Courts in Australia: The First Generation' (2003) 1 5(2) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1 36, 1 37, 1 40. 
2 7 5  United States Department of Justice, Drug Courts: The Second Decade (2006) 8 
<http://www .ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l /nij/2 1 108 1 .pdf> at 25 July 2006. 
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In most Australian States, offenders suffering solely from an alcohol addiction 
are deemed not to have a 'drug dependency' for the purposes of the relevant 
State legislation.276 As such, many alcoholics fail to qualify for Drug Court. 
This practice is extremely unfortunate, both for the alcoholics and for the 
victims of their crimes. Both Australian and international statistics highlight 
the clear causal connection between alcohol and increased criminal activity. 
One survey by the Western Australian Probation and Parole Service 
suggested that alcohol could be identified as a contributing factor in 53 % of all 
offences committed.277 Another Australian study concluded that 27% of all 
female prisoners were under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
committing their offence, more than any other illicit drug.278 In Canada, a 
team of researchers concluded that between 15%-20% of offences in Canada 
were attributable to the effects of alcohol alone with a further 10%-20% 
attributable to the use of both illicit drugs and alcohol. Interestingly, offences 
attributable to illicit drugs alone were 10%-15% .279 One report succinctly 
highlights that a significant amount of crime is attributable to the use of 
alcohol, 'almost certainly more' that all the illicit drugs combined.28° While 
numerous arguments have been forwarded in support of restricting Drug 
Court to the treatment of illicit drugs, the weight of scientific evidence 
demands that alcohol addicts receive access to a Court supervised treatment 
program. 
There is clearly a fundamental flaw in the arguments forwarded in support of 
the view that Drug Court should be restricted to illicit drug users. Firstly, a 
popular view amongst politicians and the wider community is that illicit 
drugs such as heroin involve a greater degree of dependence than alcohol. 
However, as one report points out, 'the degree of dependence is not strictly 
determined by the type of substance involved.'281 In addition, alcohol is far 
more likely to be the permanent cause of diminished cognitive functions and 
increased aggression.282 This fact probably explains the reason why alcohol is 
associated with a greater number of violent crimes than illicit drugs.283 
Secondly, some lawyers argue that since alcohol tends to be mainly associated 
with violent offences against the person, alcoholics would be disqualified 
276 For e.g. ,  Drug Court A ct 1 998 (NSW) s 5 .  
277 David Indermaur, Prisoners ' Experience with A lcohol ( 1 990) Australian Institute of  Criminology, 1 
<http://www.aic .gov.au/publications/proceedings/O l /Indermaur.pdf> at 25 July 2006. 
278 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Drug Use in A ustralia (2004), 83 < 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/phe/sdua04/sdua04.pdf> at 25 July 2006. 
279 Alex Stevens, Mike Trace and Dave Bewley-Taylor, Reducing Drug Related Crime: An Overview 
of the Global Evidence (2005) Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme 3 < 
http://www . intemationaldrugpolicy.net/reports/BeckleyFoundation Report 05 .pdf> at 25 July 2006. 
280 Robert MacCoun, Beau Kilmer and Peter Reuter, 'Research on Drugs-Crimes Linkages: The Next 
Generation' (Paper presented at the Drugs and Crime Research Forum, Sydney 1 9  April 200 1 ) . 
281  David Indermaur and Lynne Roberts, 'Drug Courts in Australia: The First Generation' (2003) 1 5(2) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1 36, 1 46 .  
282 Alex Stevens, Mike Trace and Dave Bewley-Taylor, 'Reducing Drug Related Crime : An Overview 
of the Global Evidence' ,  above n 1 4, 4. 
283 Ibid. 
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from Drug Court in many instances.284 It is further submitted by many 
observers that Australian Drug Courts are primarily aimed at offenders with 
a long history of property offending.285 However, while alcohol is more 
prevalent in relation to violent crime, alcohol is nevertheless a significant 
factor in property and other minor offending. One Australian study 
highlights that in 18 % of cases, female prisoners were under the influence of 
alcohol when committing their property or other offence.286 More 
importantly, however, many illicit drug addicts who commit property 
offences often have a long history of alcohol abuse and criminal activity 
before they begin to use drugs such as heroin. 287 If Drug Court were allowed 
to treat alcoholics at an early stage, it is possible that the percentage of people 
escalating their drug use and the rate of their offending would be reduced. 
Even more crucially, the early treatment of alcohol addiction may assist in 
preventing alcoholics from committing more violent crimes at a later stage in 
life. Overall, there are sound reasons supporting the inclusion of alcoholism 
within the definition of 'drug dependency.' 
A broader Drug Court offers hope to alcoholics: 
Expanding the ambit of Drug Court to include alcohol addiction would offer 
untold benefits to alcoholics, law enforcement agencies and the wider 
community. Just as Drug Court is effective in treating those addicted to illicit 
drugs, the Drug Court's ability to provide a mix of services tailored to each 
individual's needs would be extremely beneficial in treating alcohol 
addictions. As Susan Hayes and John Carmody rightly state: 
'Alcohol abuse is not an isolated aspect of [an offender's] life. Rather, it 
forms part of a pattern which includes self-awareness, self-esteem, 
daily living skills, personal values, future and present work and 
residential situation, health, family relationships, peer group 
influences, and possible relationship with a life-partner.'288 
By adopting a holistic approach to drug treatment, Drug Court offers a means 
by which chronic alcohol addiction can be permanently cured. In addition, 
the delivery of many of the services offered by Drug Court would not need to 
be greatly altered to accommodate alcohol addiction. In fact, the 12 step 
program currently used to treat illicit drug dependency was initially 
developed by two Americans seeking to confront their alcoholism. 
284 Gail Mason and Paul Wilson, Alcohol and Crime ( 1 989) Australian Institute of Criminology 2 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti 1 8.pdf> at 25 July 2006. 
285 Toni Makkai and Keenan Veraar, Final Report on the South East Queensland Drug Court (2003) 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 7 <http://www .aic .gov.au/publications/tbp/tbp006.html> at 24 July 
2006. 
286 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Drug Use in Australia, above n 1 3 .  
287 Wayne Hall, 'Methadone Maintenance Treatment as a Crime Control Measure' ( 1 996) 29 Crime 
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288 Susan Hayes and John Carmody, 'Helping Those Imprisoned for Alcohol Related Crime' (Paper 
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Ultimately, alcoholics should not be denied access to Drug Court simply 
because alcohol is a legal drug. In the eyes of science, alcohol can be just as 
potent a drug as heroin or ecstasy. Similarly, in the eyes of the law, alcohol 
addiction should receive the same concern and resources as illicit drugs. 
A Final Thought: 
To illustrate the potentially devastating effects of alcohol addiction, imagine 
this scenario. Richard, abandoned by his parents soon after birth, is forced to 
commit crimes just so that he could go to a children's home in order to avoid 
being molested by his abusive relatives. Over the years, he develops a chronic 
alcohol addiction. With minimal employment prospects due to his lack of 
education, Richard accumulates an extensive criminal record comprised 
mainly of minor property offences . Unfortunately, Richard never receives 
any sustained treatment for his alcohol addiction. One early morning after 
becoming heavily intoxicated, Richard breaks into a friend's house and 
brutually rapes his friend's wife. As a result of her horrific experience, the 
wife understandably suffers enormous and continuing distress. Whilst 
Richard is held in custody and the traumatised victim receives medical 
attention, the respective families wait impatiently inside the confines of the 
local police station. Unable to contain her frustration any longer, the victim's 
mother breaks the frosty tension by angrily declaring to the police officer on 
duty "My daugther would never have been raped if the police did their job 
and locked up drunken lunatics. Surely you could have done something to 
protect my innocent daughter?" The offender's uncle indignantly snaps back 
"Leave my nephew alone! A blind person could have seen that poor Richard 
was in desparate need of help. Why didn't the Court offer him a treatment 
program? They do it for cocaine users." Both sets of families stare coldly at 
the police officer, waiting for a reply. Eventually, the policeman looks up 
from his desk and quietly mumbles "There is nothing we could do . .  . it is not 
illegal to drink alcohol after all." All family members sigh in despair and 
return to pondering their loved one's fate. Perhaps the most tragic element of 
this scenario is that it is based on a true story. The case of R v Shillingsworth289 
sits quietly amongst the myriad of New South Wales Criminal Court of 
Appeal Cases, condemned to be read only by lawyers searching for yet 
another sentencing precedent on alcoholic offenders. 
The tragic case of R v Shillingsworth begs the question: how many more 
dreams must be shattered and how many more case notes must be written 
before the policeman's answer is recognised as being completely inadequate? 
Undoubtedly, many will voice the opinion that Drug Court should not be 
burdened with treating people solely addicted to alcohol. Politicians will 
proclaim that alcohol must be treated differently from other drugs and that 
Drug Court already costs too much. Drug Court skeptics will declare that 
289 [2003] NSWCCA 272 (Unreported, Meagher JA, Scully J and Smart J ,  26 September 2003) .  
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alcohol addiction cannot be adequately treated by Drug Court. However, for 
the thousands of despairing alcoholics and their associated victims around 
Australia, only one sound will be heard - the early closing of the local Drug 
Court's doors at 3pm each day. 
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